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"The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local." 1 These words were used by the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court in 2000 to explain why a statute described by
Congress as providing a "civil rights remedy" for victims of gender-biased
assaults unconstitutionally trenched on lawmaking arenas belonging to the
states. Neither the phrase "truly local" nor "truly national" appears in the
United States Constitution. Indeed, the Court's reliance on the modifier
"truly" suggested that calling something local or national did not suffice to
capture the constitutional distinction claimed-that the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) impermissibly addressed activities definitional of
and reserved to state governance.
This Essay considers the mode of analysis for which the phrases "truly
national" and "truly local" are touchstones. Categorical federalism is the
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1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding unconstitutional the civil
rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
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term I offer for this form of reasoning. Categorical federalism's method
first assumes that a particular rule of law regulates a single aspect of human
action: Laws are described as about "the family," "crime," or "civil
rights" as if laws were univocal and human interaction similarly one-
dimensional. Second, categorical federalism relies on such identification to
locate authority in state or national governments and then uses the
identification as if to explain why power to regulate resides within one or
another governmental structure. Third, categorical federalism has a
presumption of exclusive control-to wit, if it is family law, it belongs only
to the states. Categories are thus constructed around two sets of human
activities, the subject matter of regulation and the locus of governance, with
each assumed to have intelligible boundaries and autonomous spheres.
Categorical federalism has appeal, particularly in a world as full of
vivid changes as the one we inhabit. Proponents of categorical federalism
argue that its virtue lies in its democracy-enhancing features. The Court's
interventions, in the name of federalism, are supposed to engender
responsibility on the part of government officials by promoting transparent
lines of accountability. Categorical federalism posits and promises clearly
delineated allocations of power by suggesting, comfortingly, that these
delineations flow "naturally" through the United States's history from a
topic to a geographically located government. As federal judges distinguish
the "truly local" from the "truly national," they abjure their own
responsibility by casting their project as empirical rather than interpretive, a
historical exercise aimed at describing and implementing agreements forged
in 1789. A resulting cottage industry for law professors is the scouring of
texts from 1760 to 1840 to pin down the thoughts of various drafters and
Justices.
But the search for meaning from 1789 cannot work because "the
federal" had yet to be made. The issue then,' and now, is what meaning and
purposes to give to federal and state governments. In a world increasingly
conscious that "the local" and "the national" are ideas as well as places,
the quaint tidiness of categorical federalism ought to prompt skepticism. In
international parlance, "local law" refers to what in the United States is
termed "national law." Technology permits easy transgeographic
exchanges that diminish the significance of physical boundaries.
Transnational organizations promulgate worldwide legal norms, affecting
practices within nation-states.
Moreover, national borders are not the only lines that are blurring.
Boundaries of role are also shifting, as women and men explore the
2. See, e.g., JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1993)
(arguing the basic instability of the country at its inception); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, IN THE
MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1776-1820 (1997)
(examining efforts at inventing civic rituals to form a national identity).
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possibility that their genders offer less instruction on their life opportunities
than has been claimed for thousands of years. Gender systems work through
assumptions about the intelligibility of the categories of "women" and
"men," which in turn depend upon demarcations of "the family" from
"the market" and of "the private" from "the public." Currently, violence
and money play different roles in the lives of women and men. Women live
with threats to their physical safety from men within and outside their
households; women's unpaid household labors facilitate men's market
capacities. To diminish the categorical coherence of gender requires
extricating women from the dominion, both physical and economic, of
male-headed households. Efforts to do so are underway worldwide, as
longstanding rules of politics (such as who can vote), of entrenched legal
and social practices (such as who controls access to women's bodies), of
markets (such as what work is remunerated), and even of war (such as
whether victors may exercise sexual dominion over enemy civilian women)
are all being revisited.
Given this context, categorical federalism ought to be understood as a
political claim, advancing an argument that certain forms of human
interactions should be governed by a particular locality, be it a nation-state
or its subdivisions. Return then to the Chief Justice's locution-" truly
national," "truly local" -and reread it to betray anxiety as well as
insistence, as an effort to make meaningful a division that is not only
elusive but increasingly inaccurate. Categorical federalism's attempt to
buffer the states from the nation, and this nation from the globe, is faulty as
a method and wrong as an aspiration.
Below, I sketch the empirical case against categorical federalism by
showing that the very areas characterized in the VAWA litigation as
"local" -family life and criminal law-have long been subjected to federal
lawmaking. Decades of federal constitutional family law create substantive
rights anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment for parents and children, just
as decades of federal legislation-addressing welfare, pension, tax,
bankruptcy, and immigration-have defined membership in and
relationships within groupings denominated "families" by the national
government.
The normative critique of categorical federalism stems from the
political injuries caused by equating family life with state law. Categorical
federalism is not only fictive but harmful, for it deflects attention from the
many political and legal judgments made by the nation's judiciary,
executive, and Congress as they regulate the lives of current and former
householders. Federal actors ought not to be sheltered from accounting for
their work in shaping the meaning of gendered family roles. And just as it
cloaks the exercise of national powers from view, categorical federalism
also provides a false sense of security from transnational lawmaking.
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United States laws of all kinds are increasingly altered, if not trumped, by
practices stemming from quarters physically distant from Washington but
not far in forms of space that globalization has come to represent. The
United States government needs to develop means of interacting with these
laws rather than to assume an ability to remain insular. In the twenty-first
century, believing one can mandate the boundaries is seductive but wrong
(a lesson all too powerfully brought home as this Essay was in press).
To interrupt the embrace of categorical federalism, I offer another
approach, which I term multi-faceted federalism, to highlight alternative
ways of reasoning about federated governance and regulation. Categories
are endemic, in law as elsewhere, but what fills categories and their
contours varies with context. Return to the issue of violence against
women: If a man raped a woman and proclaims he did so because he likes
to inflict such pain on women, what should law call that action? Should the
description vary if the man and woman have been (or are) married instead
of strangers? If they were employer and employee? Opponents in a war?
Should the legal import vary if the man assaults the woman as she is about
to leave the house on her way to school, work, or another shelter? Do
understandings of the relevant legal norms shift upon concluding that many
men rape women, many husbands beat wives, many employers sexually
assault certain kinds of employees, and many soldiers rape women in
countries at war? As these questions illustrate, in law, decisions to
categorize are purposeful, consequentialist, and situational.
My goal is not to refuse categorization but to introduce other
presumptions into federalism discourse-that many categories are
intertwined in lawmaking enterprises and that more than one source of legal
regulation is likely to apply to any set of behaviors. This legal theory
mirrors contemporary research about categorization in cognitive
psychology. Criticism of the "classic" view that categories have specified
boundaries comes from studies demonstrating that "categories are variable
as well as stable," 3 that people use "differing bases for assessing category
membership," 4 that "[w]hat counts as a feature of a category and which
features are likely to be important" are influenced by background
knowledge,5 and that categories have ambiguous boundaries. Multi-faceted
3. Linda B. Smith & Larissa K. Samuelson, Perceiving and Remembering: Category
Stability, Variability and Development, in KNOWLEDGE, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 161, 170
(Koen Lamberts & David Shanks eds., 1997) (reporting that "people appear able to create
categories on the spot").
4. RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 33, 167-92 (1980) (discussing theory maintenance and change and how
categories are maintained despite data that ought to undermine their deployment).
5. Thomas L. Spalding & Gregory L. Murphy, What Is Learned in Knowledge-Related
Categories? Evidence from Typicality and Feature Frequency Judgments, 27 MEMORY &
COGNITION 856, 856 (1999).
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federalism brings those insights into legal discourse by providing better
descriptions of contemporary practices and more desirable goals for
federations functioning within a wealth of transnational and local activities.
The image of a faceted rock, which results in varied observations-
depending on the cut taken, the angle of the view, and the placement of the
source of light-underscores law's choices and the layers through which a
single event can be seen.
Multi-faceted federalism refuses to ascribe a single mark of identity to a
specific law. Laws may be about both family and equality, about both
economic capacity and violence. Multi-faceted federalism presumes that
governance cannot accurately be described as residing at a single site. State,
federal, and transnational laws are all likely to be relevant. And multi-
faceted federalism remembers that any assignment of dominion can be
transitory. One level of government may preside over a given set of
problems for a given period rather than forever. Were one to use this lens,
the assignment of regulatory authority would become a self-conscious act
of power, exercised with an awareness that a sequence of interpretive
judgments, made in real time and revisable in the future, undergirds any
current designation of where power to regulate what activities rests. Forms
of analysis common in what is called the law of preemption in the United
States6 would become more frequent. That body of law focuses on the
question of whether both state and federal laws can regulate a particular
event. In theory, preemption analysis is anchored in deference to
congressional choices and proceeds from the assumption that Congress did
not intend to dislodge state laws absent express direction or specific
conflicts.7 In lieu of the abstract exegesis about the Framers' purposes now
routine in judicial decisions creating categorical federalism, the judicial
6. Other federations sometimes speak of the problem of parallel and shared "competence."
For discussions of current European responses, see generally THE GENERAL LAW OF E.C.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS (Alan Dashwood & Christophe Hillion eds., 2000); and GRAINNE DE
BURCA, SETTING CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO EU COMPETENCE? (European Univ. Inst., Robert
Schuman Centre Forum Paper, 2001).
7. As currently practiced, in contrast, preemption rulings have sometimes prompted divisions
along familiar lines about whether state laws have been displaced by congressional statutes. See,
e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2419 (2001) (holding that Congress had,
through the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, preempted Massachusetts's
regulations relating to outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising). Four dissenters "strongly
disagreed." Id. at 2440 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, JJ.); see
also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard, promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, preempts
a state common-law tort action about when the obligation to provide air bags in cars arose).
Justice Breyer issued the Court's decision. Id. at 861-86. The four dissenters, joining an opinion
by Justice Stevens, included Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 229-239, all nine Justices
agreed that a provision of Massachusetts law barring state entities from purchasing goods or
services doing business with Burma was preempted by federal law. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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work would be more narrowly focused on concrete explorations of statutory
provisions as applied to specific events. Demanding factful, rather than
"factless," discussions could help tether judges to records and statutes,
thereby cabining the reach of their decisions.
Multi-faceted federalism not only functions as a means of critique but
also invites exploration of the rich veins of federalism beyond the
boundaries of contemporary legal discourse, fixated on a bipolar vision of
states acting singularly and of a predatory federal government.' The
contemporary debate about whether to prefer, a priori, the states or the
federal government for certain forms of lawmaking misses dynamic
interaction across levels of governance. In practice, federalism is a web of
connections formed by transborder responses (such as interstate agreements
and compacts) and through shared efforts by national organizations of state
officials, localities, and private interests. Regional agreements among states
are commonplace; coordinated judicial proceedings across state lines are
increasing, and many state laws are made uniform through joint efforts.
Moreover, localities routinely reach beyond the United States through, for
example, resolutions about human rights and "sister cities" programs
promoting trade. Categorical federalism ignores such endeavors, but multi-
faceted federalism calls attention to them to engender analysis of their legal
and political legitimacy.
Multi-faceted federalism brings opportunities, but I do not ignore the
risk of its admittedly open-ended approach, potentially endangering
whatever safe harbors the claimed categorical boundaries provide. Were
one to believe either that the constitutional text specifies categorical
boundaries with a clarity sufficient to withstand manipulation or that
claiming such assignments creates more common good (however defined)
than would their alteration, multi-faceted federalism opens up discussions
that some want foreclosed. For example, if one assumes a national
commitment to "civil rights" and hostility from states, decoupling civil
rights from "the national" would jeopardize the symbolic capital gained
from such an association.9 But this country's history is replete with
8. Current categorical federalism also has an internal analytic tension. National powers are
assumed to be narrowly specified; ignored is the possibility of interaction-for example, that
Congress might have extra leeway in regulating interstate commerce on equality grounds. In
contrast, states' prerogatives are seen as emanating from several sources, some textual, some
structural, some implicit. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and
Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1274-75 (2001) (explaining this disjunctive
approach and arguing that congressional powers under the Commerce Clause ought to be read to
have been altered, as the Eleventh Amendment has been, by the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
9. Similarly, if one views international human rights as securely within national powers,
perceives the federal government as receptive to and able to incorporate positive international
norms, and fears that sharing such powers with states would limit or erode such norms, multi-
faceted federalism has little appeal. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home,
35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 625-26 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]
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competing strands of antiliberal as well as liberal lawmaking at the national
level.1 0 The collapse of both the first and the second Reconstructions
illustrates that, without popular support at all levels, moments of national
affiliation to widening norms of equality are fleeting.
My willingness to stray from categorical federalism rests on the
premises that it is inaccurate as a description of current practices, that it
undermines the ability to hold actors politically accountable, and that it
disserves federations to assume that any single level of government is a
consistent source of certain sorts of social change. Further, categorical
federalism does special harm to those seeking to alter gender relations.
Categorical federalism represents a commitment to the coherence of unitary
categories; feminism poses a fundamental challenge to a host of categorical
claims about the meaning of female and male.
Categories of jurisdiction have particular saliency to women because
the legal concept of jurisdiction has served as a vehicle by which to
preserve male control, first by a claim that the family was itself a
jurisdiction free from state superintendence and then by arguing that the
family was a specially situated arena sheltered from government intrusion."
But jurisdiction can also be a means of protest against subordination;
alternative governing authorities offer the possibility of changing rules. The
achievement of VAWA was not that "the national" replaced local anti-
violence work but that it was derived from and supplemented such work,
mostly through substantial funding of local programs and symbolically
through announcing national rights of personal security for women. The
rebuff-that violence against women is beyond Congress's reach because it
is "truly local" -reiterates a painful history of using jurisdiction as a
justification for patriarchal control.
Part II grounds the analysis of federalism and gender by offering a
close examination of efforts to enhance women's equality and economic
agency by redressing violence against women. By demonstrating that
household work is constitutive of marketplace capacities and that federal
law joins state law in regulating the obligations of family members, Part III
(providing a theory of the importation of international law through "interaction, interpretation,
and internalization" by means of "vertical domestication" through federal law); Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (focusing on national
participation in transnational processes).
10. See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (1997).
11. See LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On
United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without
Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682 (1991); Reva B.
Siegel, She, the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family,
115 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20011
The Yale Law Journal
rebuts the claim, proffered by categoricalists, that judges can distinguish
among activities that are or are not "economic in nature" and that, in turn,
such a dividing line separates national from local power. Also provided is a
brief history of twentieth-century federal family laws, making plain both
the reach of federal lawmaking about family life and the impracticability of
walling off "the federal" from "the family." Part IV turns to the laws of
other polities, striving to increase women's equality through measures
addressing the interdependencies of market and family work. This
discussion examines the repeated efforts within the United States to use
federalism as a buffer against "foreign" human rights norms. By tracing the
interactions among local, national, and global rights movements, I
demonstrate that, because "the foreign" is deeply entrenched within the
United States, the proposed boundaries of the nation and the state cannot
ward off such "intrusions." Part V acknowledges the anxiety flowing from
the inevitable ambiguity of living with multiple legal regimes and sketches
what multi-faceted federalism offers for lawmaking in this federated
society.
II. CATEGORIZING THE COMPLEX: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Morrison provides a vivid
instance of and insistence upon a categorical conception of federalism.
Passed in 1994, VAWA authorized millions of dollars for programs to train
police and to provide shelters. VAWA also created new civil and criminal
provisions to ease interstate enforcement of protection orders. 2 At issue in
and held unconstitutional by Morrison was only one provision, termed by
Congress a "civil rights remedy,"' 3 permitting victims of "gender-
motivated violence" to bring actions for damages in federal courts.
Congress had held four sets of hearings on VAWA between 1991 and
1994, during which a thick record developed about the role of violence in
women's lives. Given that congressional authority was then seen as ample,
the issue of federal power to legislate did not claim center stage. Proponents
did explain that the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses provided the
constitutional premises for nationwide action.14 Factual bases came from
witnesses testifying that violence organized women's working lives by
placing certain jobs (for example, those requiring dangerous nighttime
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2262, 2265 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3 7 96gg, 10416 (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (" [l]t is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of
gender motivated violence ....").
14. See, e.g., Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 103 (1991) (statement of Prof. Cass R. Sunstein) (discussing
Commerce Clause powers); id. at 87-88 (statement of Prof. Burt Neuborne) (addressing Equal
Protection Clause powers).
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travel) out of reach. 5 Data produced by some twenty states' judiciaries
documented widespread discriminatory practices against female victims of
violence by police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors. 6
In 1995, a year after VAWA passed, the Supreme Court imposed new
standards on congressional exercise of its powers. In United States v.
Lopez,"1 a five-person majority held unconstitutional a federal criminal
statute permitting prosecution of individuals alleged to possess guns within
1000 feet of a schoolyard. The Lopez Court blamed the congressional
record for failing to identify the relationship between guns near schoolyards
and interstate commerce; lacking was a showing that the regulated activity
had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. 8 For some, the lesson of
Lopez was that Congress could not name something "commerce" without
offering sufficient bases for its action, but that Lopez only required a
coordinate branch to engage in more factfinding."9
When the legality of the congressional action was subsequently before
the Supreme Court, its proponents therefore distinguished the bare record in
Lopez from the fact-filled record in VAWA. Rather than relying only on a
generic, aggregate-effects-on-the-economy claim akin to that rejected in
Lopez,20 VAWA's advocates also pointed to record evidence that violence
targeted against women qua women limited their economic options.2
Proponents argued that, just as the Court had accepted the Commerce
Clause as a proper predicate for civil rights legislation aimed at reducing
barriers to commerce for African Americans in the 1960s," it should do the
same for gender in the 1990s. Further, to rebut the claim of national
intrusion on state prerogatives, proponents focused on the limited and
supplemental nature of the federal remedy, supported by thirty-nine state
15. See, e.g., Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear, Examining the Rise of Violence
Against Women in the State of Maine and in Other Rural Areas: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 13-17 (1993) (statement of Lisa (full name not provided)); Violence
Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 239-41 (1991) (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, National President, National
Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc.); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 n.70 (1993).
16. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41-55
(1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33-35, 41, 43-47 (1991); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 631 n.7 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (listing the reports).
17. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18. Id. at 561-63.
19. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revolutions?, 109
HARV. L. REv. 13, 37-42 (1995) (describing "the modesty of the Court's work" in Lopez).
20. 514 U.S. at 564.
21. See Brief for the United States at 5-8, 23-27, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL
1037259; Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5-12, Morrison
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032805 [hereinafter Law Professors' Amici Brief]. I was one of
several who wrote the latter brief, filed on behalf of some one hundred law professors.
22. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-62 (1964).
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attorneys general before it was enacted23 and by thirty-six when its
constitutionality was before the Supreme Court.24
The majority opinion in Morrison is, in contrast, notably "factless," by
which I mean that it refused to engage with the record before it. The
majority did not delve into the claimed relationship between market
participation and gender-targeted violence, nor did it interrogate whether
and in what fashion states were harmed by the provision of a supplemental
civil cause of action in federal court. Rather, the majority stipulated that
aggression against women was "non-economic, criminal violent
conduct." 2 The majority then argued that, if Congress could regulate such
criminal activity, it could "equally as well" regulate "family law and other
areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage,
divorce, and childbearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant." 26
Why did the Morrison majority-and even more so, the en banc Fourth
Circuit decision below"7-view VAWA as a federal assault on state
governance of the family? Morrison itself did not involve family members.
A young woman university student, alleging that two male co-students had
raped her, filed the VAWA complaint," assumed by the lower courts
sufficient to show animus based on gender.29 Similarly, almost half of the
fifty reported decisions on VAWA's civil rights remedy had likewise
23. See Letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York on Behalf of His
Colleagues to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee (July 22,
1993), in Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 34 (1993). The thirty-
nine state attorneys general were joined by the attorneys general of the District of Columbia and
Guam. Id.
24. See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. in Support of Petitioners, Brief on the Merits,
Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032809 (arguing VAWA's constitutionality on
Commerce Clause grounds). Only one state-Alabama-filed in support of its invalidation. See
Brief for the State of Alabama as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Morrison (Nos. 99-5,
99-29), 1999 WL 1191432.
25. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617; see also id. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."). A second ground for decision was that,
because the statute authorized damage actions against nonstate defendants, Congress could not
rely on its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Id. at 619-27. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
YALE L.J. 441,473-509 (2000) (criticizing this aspect of the opinion).
26. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
27. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 842-43, 896 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
28. Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, alleged that she had been
raped by two athletes, one of whom later claimed, "I like to get girls drunk and fluck the shit out
of them." See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Va. 1996). The
university initially imposed a sanction of an immediate two-semester suspension on one of the
assailants but later reduced it to a deferred suspension (after graduation) and a required one-hour
educational program. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 955 (1996) (Motz, J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. at 785; Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 830.
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involved work or educational settings, not interactions within families.3"
Moreover, Congress had precluded federal courts from exercising their
ordinarily available powers of supplemental jurisdiction over claims raised
between VAWA plaintiffs and defendants if related to divorce, alimony, or
child custody,3 thereby creating a statutory barrier to any "family" issues
attempting to ride the coattails of a VAWA lawsuit. Yet the Morrison
majority equated a complex set of legal regulations with the categories of
family and crime, located those categories as subject to state governance,
insisted on the naturalness of the division, and assumed the federal/state
options to be bipolar and exclusive. Through categorical federalism,
Morrison established the Court's role as superintendent over Congress's
exercise of its Commerce Clause powers, just as the Court (or more
accurately, its now famous five-person majority) has claimed its authority
over congressional implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment.32
III. THE FAILINGS OF CATEGORICAL FEDERALISM:
PICKING AND CONSTRUCTING BOXES
Two kinds of defects undermine the claimed coherence of categorical
federalism: Category mistakes are common, and permanent categorization
is itself a mistake. The first objection, about category errors, offers a
critique from within the normative framework of categorical federalism,
while the second objects to the framework itself. This Part makes both
arguments by excavating the stipulated truths (that violence against women
is not "economic in nature," that the Constitution requires a distinction
between "the truly national" and the "truly local," and that family law is
the domain of states) proffered by the Morrison majority to obscure its own
role in making the meaning of commerce, of women's roles and the import
of violence, and of the relationships among state law, federal law, and
family life.
I begin by probing the idea of something being "economic in nature"
and, after detailing the relationships between gender, householding, and
wage work, question why federal laws aimed at protecting women failed
this test. I also demonstrate the malleability of the naturally economic by
looking at post-Morrison decisions finding debts to pay child support not
"economic in nature" but laws prohibiting possession of child pornography
and protecting wolves in the wild sufficiently "commercial in character" to
30. See Law Professors' Amici Brief, supra note 21, at 3-15.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (e)(4) (1994) (altering the effects of 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
32. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). For critical analyses of the Court's
approach, see generally Evan H. Carnker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127 (2001); and Post & Siegel, supra note 25.
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permit federal lawmaking. Brought to the fore is the role played by
morality; certain forms of federal morals legislation pass even
contemporary Commerce Clause tests. Thereafter, I turn to the relationship
between federal law and families. Assuming for that discussion the
propriety of the Morrison majority classification of VAWA as about family
and criminal law, I disagree with its proposition that the "federal" has no
role to play. Rather, the extant legal patterns are best described as multi-
faceted federalism in which state and federal laws cohabit.
A. "Economic in Nature"
1. Gender and Economic Agency
The Morrison majority claimed that violence against women was not
"economic in nature."33 Even as it constructed this category, the majority
denied its own role in making it:
While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these
[commerce] cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature. 4
What could "economic in nature" mean? The phrase is one coined
relatively recently by judges35 rather than found in the literature of
economics, which does not evidence much of a sense that it has "natural"
boundaries.36 Economists proffer analyses for an array of human activity,
including family life.37 Consider also the boundary-bending term "home
economics," coined a century ago to make plain that tasks once thought
33. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
34. Id.
35. The phrase appeared in a few Supreme Court decisions before Morrison. See, e.g., BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996) (equating "economic in nature" with the dollar
value of damage to a car); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 511-12 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting congressional reports describing the problems faced by minority businesses
as "economic in nature"). In one deployment, Justice Brennan described economic injury as a
facet of the burdens flowing from discrimination. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 958
n.5 (1988) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that criminal statutes enacted
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment ought to protect against injuries from involuntary servitude
that are "psychological, social, and economic in nature" and disagreeing with the majority
requirement of a showing of "physical or legal coercion").
36. See Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 973 (2000) (criticizing the
broad ambitions and the narrow lens of behavioral economics).
37. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (2d ed. 1991).
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definitional of household labor-laundry, baking, and making clothes-
had, by the early 1900s, become associated with the market.3"
The interplay between markets and homes was and is thick.39 Federal
funds supported education in home economics as a part of vocational
training;" efforts at "municipal housekeeping" aimed to improve
localities;4' and businesses relied on home economists to market products to
consumers.42 Contemporary feminist arguments address the lack of market
value accorded to work within households.43 Some seek to have that work
commodified as a means of underscoring that, in two-adult households,
women's work inside the household subsidizes and enables wage-earning
outside the household. Once women are understood as economic agents
when at home as well as when at wage workplaces, laws prohibiting attacks
on women in or outside their homes can similarly be understood as
protecting and enabling economic capabilities.
That violence against women, in particular, should not be included
within activities that are "economic in nature" is painfully ironic. Women
were once understood as all too "economic in nature," as a species of
property, a bundle of goods and services.' The Supreme Court has many
38. See Sarah Stage, Home Economics: What's in a Name?, in RETHINKING HOME
ECONOMICS: WOMEN AND THE HISTORY OF A PROFESSION 1, 5-6 (Sarah Stage & Virginia B.
Vincenti eds., 1997) [hereinafter RETHINKING HOME ECONOMICS] (discussing the consideration
of other terms-" household arts," "domestic economy," and "domestic science"-at
conferences that resulted in the creation of the American Home Economic Association in 1909).
Federal grant programs for agricultural studies also linked the words home and economic. See,
e.g., First Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-308 (1994) (funding the teaching of mechanical
and agricultural arts); Smith-Lever Act of 1914, 7 U.S.C. §§ 341-342 (promoting "the
development of practical applications of research knowledge... in agriculture, home economics,
and rural energy").
39. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
40. Projects were promoted through the Department of Agriculture, which in 1923
established the Bureau of Home Economics. That Bureau detailed its activities yearly. The
Reports of the Chief of the Bureau of Home Economics were published annually from 1924 to
1942 in the Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture.
41. See MARY RITTER BEARD, WOMAN'S WORK IN MUNICIPALITIES (1915) (invoking the
home both as a template for the municipality and as a haven from it); NANCY TOMES, THE
GOSPEL OF GERMS: MEN, WOMEN AND THE MICROBE IN AMERICAN LIFE 183-233 (1998)
(detailing the link between the home economics movement and the public health movement).
42. See, e.g., Ronald R. Kline, Agents of Modernity: Home Economists and Rural
Electrification, 1925-1950, in RETHINKING HOME ECONOMICS, supra note 38, at 237, 239
(discussing the "large number of home economists who worked in a vast network of
manufacturers, utility companies, state colleges, government agencies, and farm cooperatives to
electrify rural America").
43. E.g., NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES (2001);
JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do
ABOUT IT (2000); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
44. See KERBER, supra note I1, at 11-29 (discussing the American incorporation of English
laws of the family, including the practice of coverture, in which women, upon marriage, lost
control over their property and had no civic identity); Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes
on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157 (Rayna R.
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times acknowledged that women can be treated as commodities. For
example, in the early part of the twentieth century, the Court upheld the
Mann Act (named after its sponsor) making illegal the transportation of
women for "immoral purposes" across state lines.45 Despite the defendant's
argument that no money had been exchanged for sex,46 the Court approved
the statute by analogizing the movement of women to that of articles of
merchandise.47 This law remains in use." More recent legislation also
addresses the treatment of women as property by penalizing "trafficking," 4 9
which is on the rise as an artifact of current forms of globalization." Yet,
when women seek to be holders and producers of property, to be players in
the market, thinking about women in economic terms is claimed to be a
category error.
Even some commentators who seek to engender more national
rightsmaking would rather avoid the language of commerce-arguing that
it dilutes commitments to freedom and status transformation.5 The strategic
reason why VAWA relied on commerce powers is understood. In the
Reiter ed., 1975) (relying on anthropological data to demonstrate the "gifts" of women and the
ways in which they performed intersocietal commercial and political functions).
45. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
46. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Caminetti (No. 139) (arguing that while the statute
could lawfully be applied to commercialized sex, it should not be applied to conduct
"objectionable only for its immorality").
47. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491-93. Further, the Court recognized that Congress had intended
to regulate interstate transportation of women not only for economic gain but also if incidental to
an "immoral purpose," construed to include inducing a woman to become a prostitute or "a
concubine or mistress." Id. at 485-89.
48. In 1986, the Mann Act was amended to make its terms gender neutral and to linit its
application to interstate transportation for prostitution or "any sexual activity for which any
person can be charged with a criminal offense," thereby linking its provisions to state laws
governing sexual behavior. See Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-628, 100 Stat. 3511-12 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2423 (1994)) (addressing coercion and
minors); H.R. REP. No. 99-910 (1986).
49. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-7110 (West Supp. 2000)); Ratna Kapur, The
Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject in International/Post-
Colonial Feminist Legal Politics (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing
that interest in regulation of sexuality and a focus on violence against women reinforce the image
of women as victims and may inhibit their emancipation).
50. See Saskia Sassen, Women's Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization: The
Feminization of Survival, 53 J. INT'L AFF. 503 (2000) (discussing how the migration of money
and people reflects the relationships among debt levels, tourist trades, and transactions in
humans); see also Marjan Wijers, European Union Policies on Trafficking in Women, in GENDER
POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 209 (Mariagrazia Rossilli ed., 2000) (providing an overview
of differing approaches member states take with regard to sex workers and whether such workers
should have the option of that form of work, in part to enable migration).
51. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:
Labor and the Shaping of the Post-New Deal Constitutional Order, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2002) (arguing that, had New Deal labor legislation been supported
through elaboration of the Thirteenth Amendment rather than based on Congress's power over
commerce, a broader understanding would have developed, forestalling the contemporary
retrenchment).
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1960s, the Supreme Court had avoided questions about congressional
power to reach "private" actors under the Fourteenth Amendment by
relying on the Commerce Clause to uphold civil rights legislation. Yet, say
such objectors, congressional power to deal with violence against women
ought to be understood as related to equality, not commerce."
But framing the problem of violence against women as embedded in
commerce provides descriptive accuracy and normative instruction about
the degree to which the current economy is formed by gendered allocations
of work that subordinate women. Obtaining equality for women depends
upon their gaining recognition as commercial actors. Virginia Woolf
explained it well in 1928 when she compared the value of the right to vote
(then recently won) with the receipt of a regular income (specifically her
new "legacy" of "five hundred pounds a year"): "The money, I own,
seemed infinitely the more important." 13 Her book's title-A Room of
One's Own-reflects the power to control one's physical space. "[T]hat
five hundred a year stands for the power to contemplate.... a lock on a
door means the power to think for oneself." 1
4
A locked room denotes a safe space, a home. Yet many women do not
have that safety, as home-based aggression blocks their access to
participation in the national economy. Once out the door, the fear of
walking down deserted streets, of using public transportation at night, and
of entering empty corridors disproportionately affects women, who
regularly report surveying their surroundings as a protective measure.55
Moreover, once at work, physical threats remain for women. The law of
sexual harassment now marks the idea that women are harmed at work
because they are women. But the term "sexual harassment" may mask (for
some) that not only are women confronted with threats of sex, they are also
sometimes physically assaulted.56 The argument is not that every act of
52. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term- Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 103 ("Candid supporters of VAWA can concede that
the issue of violence against women is not mainly an economic one, or chiefly an interstate
one.").
53. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 37 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1957)
(1929). She gained that income at about the same time, 1919, that women gained the ight to vote
in England. Id. at 37, 116.
54. Id. at 110.
55. See MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989); Cynthia
Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV.
517 (1993). Aggregate data from 1994 indicate that women are more likely to be victimized in
private homes by people known to them, while men are more likely to be victimized in public
places by strangers. See DIANE CRAVEN, SEX DIFFERENCES IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1994, at
1, 4, 6 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report NCJ-164508, 1997), http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/sdvv.pdf. Women's fear of public spaces may -be exaggerated or their fear of private
places may be too low. Alternatively, women's fear of public spaces may prompt them to be
careful, thereby lowering their rate of injury.
56. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralist Understanding of
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
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violence directed at women is aimed at undermining economic capacity but
that, cumulatively, the volume of violence directed against women limits
women's roles as commercial actors and as wage-workers. Decades ago,
Commerce Clause jurisprudence shifted to acknowledge the
interrelationship between production and sales and to take into account that
enterprises like insurance and agriculture, once thought to be "local," are
too much a part of the national economy to be exempt from federal
regulation." Commerce Clause jurisprudence could shift again, now to
acknowledge that activities such as gender-targeted violence, once
conceived as external to the economy, are constitutive of it.5" That federal
powers are enumerated does not tell us what content they have.
2. Endangered Children and Wolves
In Morrison's wake, the category of "the economic" has taken on a
vitality that opens up challenges to many federal statutes about topics
Harassment, 107 YALE L. 1683 (1998). For a discussion of economic coercion, see BARBARA
A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE (1985).
57. Recall the Court's view in 1895 that "[t]he fact that an article is manufactured for export
to another state does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce." United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895). That ruling was a part of a series of cases rejecting
congressional regulations based on the Commerce Clause over a range of activities, including
manufacturing monopolies, E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, insurance, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer
Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913), and labor relations at mines, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936). As the E.C. Knight Co. Court explained, to do otherwise would be to permit
Congress to regulate "every branch of human industry," resulting in regulation of "interests
which in their nature are and must be local in all the details of their successful management." E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 14-15. Similarly, the Court in New York Life Insurance Co. invoked the
image of "contracts purely domestic in their nature." 231 U.S. at 506 (citations omitted).
While subsequent revisions came through holdings that manufacturing, NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and agriculture, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), were parts of interstate commerce, the predicates for the earlier decisions parallel those
invoked today. The majority, then and now, assumes that congressional power must be contained,
that the means to do so is to categorize some form of activity as local "in nature," and, as a
consequence, that the implausibility of the constitutionality of congressional regulation becomes
plain on its face.
58. Others make a different claim, that the ambiguity and breadth of the category of the
"commercial" in Morrison permits Congress to reach all crimes "fundamentally financial in
nature, such as fraud or theft" as well as certain forms of violence. See Jesse H. Choper & John C.
Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REv. 843, 866
(2000) (arguing that if "domestic violence" involved a "commercial transaction-such as
purchasing a weapon, renting a car or hotel room," it might also be subject to congressional
prohibition). In a similar vein, Representative John Conyers introduced a bill creating a civil cause
of action for a crime "motivated by gender" if "the defendant or the victim travels in interstate or
foreign commerce" or uses "a facility or instrumentality" of interstate or foreign commerce or a
weapon that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, or if the "offense interferes with
commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of conduct." See
Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2000, H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000)
(proposing also that the Attorney General have the discretion to bring actions against states,
subdivisions, or their officials for patterns of discrimination "on the basis of gender in the
investigation or prosecution of gender-based crimes").
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ranging from debt repayment to child pornography to endangered species.
As the case law grows, we have come to learn that not all kinds of debt are
"economic in nature" but that some wild animals are sufficiently a part of
the economy as to permit congressional action.
A first example is the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA) 9 enacted
in 1992 and modified in 1998. The statute makes certain willful failures to
pay child support, if noncustodial parents live in another state, a federal
offense.' In the years. before Morrison, several defendants challenged the
CSRA, all unsuccessfully, as circuit after circuit found it constitutional.6'
As one commentator explained, the reason for unanimity was "simple: The
CSRA is within Congress's Commerce Clause power because the statute
regulates the payment (or nonpayment) of money across state lines."' 62
Further, federal oversight of interstate obligations is not unique to this
context; "jurisdiction jumping" is also a phenomenon in bankruptcy.63
Since Morrison, however, a few lower courts have held the CSRA
unconstitutional on the ground that, like VAWA, it relates to a sphere of
human activity inappropriate for national legislation. While lower court
judges disagree, these decisions illuminate the ongoing effort to curb
federal power through categorical claims about the economic import of
family life. For example, according to one decision, child support debt was
not "commercial in nature," described as the "mutual exchange of value
motivated by economic self-interest," 4 because orders to pay child support
lack "this essential feature of reciprocity." 65
59. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994), amended by Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (criminalizing the failure of a parent in one
state to pay child support for a period of more than a year or of an amount "greater than $5,000"
if done so "willfully... with respect to a child who resides in another State"). Further, any
person who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to evade a support
obligation, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer than 1 year, or is greater
than $5,000" may also be subjected to felony punishments. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(2). The 1998
amendments increased penalties against those who "attempt to escape state-issued child support
orders by fleeing across state lines." See 144 CONG. REc. H3044 (daily ed. May 12, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Steny H. Hoyer).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1033 (1998); United States v. Johnson, 114 F,3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sage, 92
F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
62. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study
in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 948 (2000).
63. See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 227, 229 (2000) (discussing "the market for deadbeats" by considering how
variations in laws can facilitate exit strategies for certain kinds of debtors).
64. See United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding the 1992 statute
unconstitutional because it imposed liability not for "recovery of child support payments avoided
by interstate flight... [but only based on] obligations owed by one family member to another,
using diversity of residence as a jurisdictional 'hook"'). That decision was subsequently vacated
pending reargument en banc, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000), and then reversed in United States v.
Faasse, No. 98-2337, 2001 W.L 1058237 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2001). Four judges dissented,
reiterating the claim of an absence of "reciprocity," id. at *15 (Batchelder, J., dissenting, joined
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The idea of the family as a nonreciprocal entity stems from eras in
which male patriarchs had power over both wives and children. Law
enforced that regime in many ways. Wives were not legally competent to
enter contracts or to bring lawsuits. Federal diversity jurisdiction was itself
unavailable because the husband and wife, legally one, could not be citizens
of different states. Once laws of coverture were jettisoned, however, such
jurisdictional prohibitions and laws of interspousal immunity began to
fall.66 Adults in household units gained the status of legally interrelated,
independent adults, both of whom were required to support their minor
children.
Law has done more than abolish prior practices; it has imposed new
obligations on family members. For example, custodial parents receiving
federally supported benefits must assist in obtaining child support from
noncomplying co-parents or risk a loss of benefits.67 Federal statutes thus
use one parent's economic self-interest to motivate her (or, infrequently,
him) to help the government pursue the other. Markets also reinforce the
interdependent economic obligations within households; work time spent in
providing care to one's own children reduces work time for wage earning.68
As a consequence, partners in marriage, ex-partners in divorce, and never-
married coventurers often rely on "mutual promises and bargains," 69 as do
other contracting parties.
by Boggs, Norris, and Suhreheinrich, JJ.), and protesting the majority decision as licensing
"virtually limitless federal police power" in violation of current Supreme Court law, id. at * 14.
65. Faasse, 227 F.3d at 670. Faasse also concluded that the CSRA interfered with
Michigan's family law policies by criminalizing acts that the state did not, id. at 664-65, and that
Congress had no power to regulate debts "merely because the obligor and obligee reside in
different states," id at 668.
66. A contemporary doctrine-the "domestic relations exception" to diversity jurisdiction-
is a legacy of that regime. Although the congressional grant of diversity does not mention such an
exclusion, the Supreme Court has construed the diversity statute to require that federal courts
decline to adjudicate cases between citizens of different states involving the requisite dollar
amount if the litigants dispute issues related to marriage, alimony, divorce, or child custody. In
contrast, tort disputes between family or former family members were not held to be outside
federal diversity jurisdiction. See Ankenbandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1994). The pressures to comply are substantial. See ANNE CASE,
1-FEN LIN & SARA MCLANAHAN, UNDERSTANDING CHILD SUPPORT TRENDS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8056, 2000) (discussing the centrality of child support payments as sources of income
for single mothers).
68. CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN & CHRISTOPH M. SCHMIDT, THE WAGE PERFORMANCE OF
IMMIGRANT WOMEN: FULL-TIME JOBS, PART-TIME JOBS, AND THE ROLE OF SELECTION (Ctr. for
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series No. 2702, 2001) (providing a case study detailing
how husbands and children affect women's participation in wage-work).
69. This language comes from a decision upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (FACE), which distinguished the CSRA decisions on the ground that, unlike state-
imposed child support orders, clinics rely on "mutual promises and bargains by suppliers, doctors,
patients, and other employees." Norton v. Reno, No. 4:00-CV-141, 2000 WL 1769580, at *6
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2000).
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Yet some federal judges, attempting to shift the focus from the
custodial parent to the child as creditor,7" reject the concept that debts
arising from parenthood reflect reciprocal agreements on the allocation of
work between parents. Further, national laws are claimed to interfere
impermissibly with state prerogatives.7" As another federal judge explained:
The Supreme Court's current federalism jurisprudence teaches that
the CSRA, by making it a federal crime to fail to make child
support payments-a matter of family law-based merely on the
fact that the parent and child reside in different states, upsets the
delicate balance "between what is truly national and what is truly
local." 72
In contrast, statutes prohibiting conduct less readily commodifiable
have survived Morrison challenges, as the term "economic in nature" is
supplemented with the concept that something can be "commercial in
character."73 One example comes from constitutional objections lodged by
criminal defendants charged with possession of sexually explicit depictions
of minors if those depictions or the materials used to produce them were
shipped in interstate commerce.74 Courts have concluded that possession of
such photographs, even when self-generated and not intended for
commercial use, is enough like the production of local wheat in Wickard v.
Filburn75 to qualify as economic activity. Why? Because local possession
of photos "interacts with a national market on both the supply and demand
side," thereby justifying a congressional conclusion that it had power to
reach the activity. Unlike the majority in Morrison, reluctant to accede to
70. See Faasse, 2001 WL 1058237, at *24 n. 1 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
71. id. at *23 (stating that the "Act emasculates the states' ability to assign social and other
costs to the disobedience of child support orders" ).
72. United States v. King, No. 53 00 Cr. 653, 2001 WL 111278, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
2001); see also United States v. Benton, No. 00-4864, 2001 WL 876901 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2001)
(concluding, in an unpublished disposition, that the Fourth Circuit's prior view of the
constitutionality of the CSRA was unaltered by Morrison). But see United States v. MacWeeney,
No. 00 Cr. 0223, 2000 WL 1634400 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2000) (distinguishing Morrison in a
decision holding constitutional the 1998 version of the CSRA, discussed supra note 59).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2000).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). This provision was amended in 1998
to make the possession of one or more (as contrasted with three or more) sexually explicit
depictions of a minor an offense. See Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 203(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2977, 2978 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)).
75. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
76. Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 230 (distinguishing the "rape at issue in Morrison"). A dissenter
protested that:
[T]his simple local possession of self-generated pornographic material, where no
commercial activity was involved, no interstate transportation took place, and no
congressional findings support the necessity of such regulation in the framework of a
broader regulatory scheme, is beyond the reach of any reasonable interpretation of
Congress' Commerce Clause power.
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congressional assessments about women and violence, these judges readily
relied on congressional views of the need for national protection against
possession of child pornography."
"Judicial deference to the judgment of the democratic branches" 7 8 was
also in evidence in a Fourth Circuit decision, Gibbs v. Babbitt, which
provides further insight into the plasticity of the new commerce
jurisprudence. A man shot a wolf who had strayed onto private lands; he
was charged under federal laws making it illegal to "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" any threatened or
endangered species.7 9 His challenge raised the question of congressional
power to protect endangered species on private property. Recall that judges
within the Fourth Circuit were the first to hold that violence against women
was not related to commerce.8° In contrast, in Gibbs v. Babbitt, the circuit
concluded that "economic activity must be understood in broad terms...
not... limited to its '18th-century' forms. 8' Because the motivation to
harm wolves came from farmers and ranchers worried about commercially
valuable livestock, because wolves had been and might again be hunted for
their pelts, because wolves were part of a "national wildlife-related
recreational industry that involves tourism and interstate travel,"82 and
because the regulation of red wolf takings was "also closely connected to a
second interstate market-scientific research" -which generated jobs83 and
might also lead to "other potential economic activities,"'  it was up to
Id. at 233 (Jolly, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing Morrison and Lopez); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000) (relying also on a market stimulation theory, as well as an analogy
to addiction); United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the Third
Circuit). For other courts, the interstate nexus (photographs taken with film or by a camera made
in a state other than that of the defendant) suffices. See United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652
(1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072
(1999).
77. Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 229. That court relied on the commercial nature of the activity
because, in its view, a "jurisdictional hook" -interstate transactions-was insufficient alone to
support the statute's constitutionality. id.
78. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v.
Norton, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (2001) (making some exceptions
when red wolves harm pets or livestock).
80. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
8 1. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491 (quoting Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995)). The judge who had authored the en banc VAWA decision dissented.
See id. at 506 (Luttig, J., dissenting). As Judge Luttig explained, "The number of inferences (not
even to mention the amount of speculation) necessary to discern in this activity a substantial effect
on interstate commerce is exponentially greater than the number necessary in ... Morrison to
show a substantial effect on interstate commerce from domestic assault." Id. at 507.
82. Id. at 493 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 494.
84. Id. at 497. Moreover, the regulation was a part of a larger picture, the Endangered Species
Act, which is "a comprehensive and far-reaching piece of legislation that aims to conserve the
health of our national environment." Id.
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Congress-not the courts-to weigh the value of removing wolves to
protect commercial development against the value of restoring the species.
Thus, the court rejected federalism pleas that land regulation and wildlife
management were "traditional state functions." 85 Endangering women is
about family life, claimed to be the province of state law; endangering
animals is potentially about commerce, and that potential suffices to sustain
national laws, at least thus far at the circuit level.86
3. The Commerce in and of Morals
This foray into doctrine illustrates that, even with the new addendum of
"economic in nature," choices abound about the reach of Commerce
Clause powers. The current judicial effort to naturalize its conclusions by
reference to activities "economic in nature" or "commercial in character"
resembles the nineteenth-century equation of commerce with sales.87 The
issue is not whether commerce could be so circumscribed but rather why to
draw this particular line. Given the import of the Commerce Clause holding
in Morrison for constitutional law, the majority's discussion is cursory,
lacking much by way of justification other than reductionist categorical
stipulations.
Had the majority, in contrast, taken on a forthright exploration of
Commerce Clause precedents, it would have been required to distinguish its
frequent approval of the use of Commerce Clause powers to sustain social
morals legislation-ranging from the many federal statutes reinforcing
conventional status arrangements (such as the prohibition on possession of
forms of pornography) to the more unusual ones altering entrenched
practices (such as the 1960s civil rights legislation). Indeed, the majority
would have confronted not only repeated recognition of federal power but,
upon occasion, the unapologetic use of Commerce Clause powers to
"promote the general welfare, material and moral." " For example, in early
twentieth-century case law sustaining congressional regulation of liquor,
lotteries, prostitution, and sexuality, the Court repeatedly upheld the
propriety of national-level efforts (acknowledged to have "'the quality of
85. Id. at 500.
86. Other limitations may soon be imposed on Commerce Clause powers. See Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (avoiding the question of
constitutionality by finding a regulation beyond statutory authority). Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented, relying on Gibbs in part and distinguishing
Morrison. Id. at 192-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the other hand, given the attack on New York
in the fall of 2001, the desire for national security will likely damp down interest in constraints on
some aspects of federal power.
87. Justice Thomas has advocated returning to this conception. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1912).
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police regulations"' 89) to exert social control. Mann Act prosecutions did
not focus exclusively on the commerce in sex. Rather, a high percentage
involved interracial couples, interstate adulterers, and breaches of promise
to marry.9" The justification rested squarely on the national government's
need to protect certain forms of family life--" 'the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization." ''9' Deciding in an era when
Commerce Clause powers were read more narrowly than during the
subsequent sixty years, the Court read Article I to permit police power
policies aimed at suppressing activities seen as immoral so long as an
interstate "hook" was available.
The Mann Act example cannot be cast aside as a relic of times past. In
this era, when Commerce Clause powers are again being narrowed, the
condemnation of certain forms of immorality continues to provide licensure
for federal powers, as is exemplified by the Child Pornography and the
Trafficking in Women Acts. Given these decades of rulings, the puzzle is
why that umbrella did not suffice to shelter VAWA's civil remedy. VAWA
could have been read as responsive to the threat to family life stemming
from the immorality of hitting one's wife (and hence within the convention
of federal social welfare legislation) or as an innovative gender equality
provision, following the model of public accommodations laws (and hence
within the convention of federal civil rights legislation). That a high volume
of cases might have resulted has been proffered as the basis of some federal
judges' objection to VAWA,92 but were plentitude alone the issue, the
rationale would also topple pornography regulation.
89. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492 (1916) (quoting Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323).
90. See, e.g., DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND
THE MANN ACT 139-97 (1994).
91. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 487 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)). Murphy
upheld a federal act providing that Utah voters could only be registered if legally qualified and
that "no polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabiting with more than one woman, and no
woman cohabiting with any of the persons described.., shall be entitled to vote." Murphy, 114
U.S. at 28-29.
92. State and federal judges urged Congress not to enact the provision, relying in part on a
"judicial impact statement" provided to the Judicial Conference of the United States that had
warned of "as many as 53,800 civil tort cases annually," of which "13,450... are anticipated to
reach the Federal Courts." Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10, 15-16 (1991) (reprinting Violence Against
Women Act of 1991, a judicial impact statement on S. 15 prepared by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts); see also Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and
Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 270-77 (2000) (detailing
the initial opposition and then the subsequent decision by the Judicial Conference not to oppose
the passage of the civil rights remedy).
The judicial impact statement's prediction proved wildly inaccurate. In the years between
enactment and the Morrison decision, only about fifty cases were reported. Law Professors'
Amici Brief, supra note 21, at 14 (providing the data); see Jenny Rivera, A Promise Waiting To
Be Fulfilled: The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and the Construction of Multiple
Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 463, 488 (1996)
(criticizing VAWA's civil rights provisions as unlikely to be used by many of those eligible to do
so because of a lack of the resources needed to pursue federal litigation).
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Explanation of the refusal to subsume VAWA within legitimate federal
morals and civil rights legislation requires an appreciation of the stakes
embedded in VAWA's civil rights remedy. It promised more than access to
federal courts for the relatively few claimants seeking damages for gender-
motivated violence. Had VAWA been sustained, federal legislative power
would also have been available to redress other aspects of women's
inequality. For example, as Justice O'Connor indicated at the Morrison oral
argument, if the Court upheld VAWA's civil rights remedy, perhaps
Congress could have the power to address discrimination in alimony
payments made upon divorce.93 Federal laws might also have considered
the question of compensation for home-based but currently unpaid
"domestic" labor. Indeed, current federal pension law takes comparable
concerns into account. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) allocates the wage-work benefits of pensions between spouses and
protects divorced spouses in an effort to further equality norms; it is a
species of marital property law.94 Similarly, the Family and Medical Leave
Act, whose application to states has now been limited through Eleventh
Amendment doctrine,9 had begun a conversation about the relationship
between caregiving obligations and wage work. Commerce Clause powers
could thus have been the basis for Congress to experiment with efforts to
alter the gendered patterns of the economy, constituted by wage and
nonwage work, inside and outside households. VAWA was but one aspect
of the many possible exercises of federal power needed to achieve a
categorical shift of women from dependent householders to physically
secure equal citizens, able to partake of the full range of economic and
political activities.
Those prospects proved intolerable for those intent on constraining
national powers because they object to specific substantive policies and/or
to the use of federal power to forward them. Keenly aware of the
interdependencies of economic transactions and status, the search for a cap
on "commerce" is a search to limit national lawmaking. The goal of
reining in federal power is, of course, a reasonable political stance, but
represents a choice between competing and contested views about the
meaning of the United States Constitution. Through deployment of
93. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos.
99-5, 99-29), 2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 22, at *16.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994) (mandating a qualified joint and survivor annuity for surviving
spouses); id. § 1056(d)(3)(D) (permitting court orders that transfer pension benefits from a plan
participant to a former spouse upon divorce).
95. Id. § 2611. The courts reason that, because the Act is gender-neutral and provides for
leaves beyond those to care for children, Congress did not provide means congruent and
proportional to an identifiable constitutional injury of gender discrimination and, therefore, that
individuals cannot obtain monetary relief from state employers under the Act. See, e.g., Chittister
v. Dep't of Cmty. Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d
559 (6th Cir. 2000).
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categorical federalism, however, the majority in Morrison neither provides
an account of nor takes responsibility for its decision to stop federal
legislation aimed at acknowledging female subordination inside households
and the role that violence plays in economic citizenship.
In this discussion, I have deliberately linked VAWA, marking a
progressive national effort to remake status relationships, with the history
of federal statutes now seen by many as unattractive examples of social
control. As Alexander Bickel explained, legislation like the Mann Act was
inspired by "distinct strains of anti-urbanism, of xenophobia and opposition
to continued large-scale immigration, and even of anti-Semitism." 9 6 Both
VAWA and the Mann Act are founded on a view of federal constitutional
power that is expansive. Their juxtaposition underscores that deployment of
federal power is not, however, inevitably wise. Both statutes augment state
police powers. Both have the potential to displace conflicting state laws
evidencing differing views on the moral, political, and economic status of
women. I offer these examples (and more below) of the many varieties of
federal social welfare legislation to remind readers that multi-faceted
federalism is not a new word for a pro-national stance but rather an effort to
shift the focus toward the many sources of political rightsmaking, all to be
engaged critically as we make meaning of both "the federal" and of
"women's rights."
B. Working Moms, "Runaway Pappys," and Visiting Grandparents
By categorizing violence against women as not "economic in nature"
but related to family law and crime, the Morrison majority claimed a
relationship between family, crime, and state government in which federal
law could play no role. Critique is again available at two levels, first that
the majority had choices when categorizing and erred, and second, that
boxing itself into a choice was itself an error. For the first aspect of this
analysis, I will share the majority's premise that VAWA was centrally
related to family life.
VAWA symbolizes an understanding that violence within households,
"domestic" in popular nomenclature, is a violation of "national" rights of
adults to be equally safe within families. The power of the legislation
should not be equated with the one provision struck in Morrison. The bulk
of VAWA survives and thrives. In the years between 1994 and 1999,
Congress provided $1.4 billion to antiviolence programs, including $549
million for services, training, officers, and prosecutors-" STOP" -to all
fifty states; $21 million for "safe houses" and law enforcement training;
96. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 229 (1984).
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some $140 million to facilitate arrests and prosecutions; $40 million
focused on rural domestic violence against women and children; and $32
million in legal assistance and in grants for college campuses, community
policing, and for help to children exposed to such violence.97 In the fall of
2000, Congress reauthorized VAWA and provided yet more funds.9"
VAWA also continues to facilitate the interstate enforcement of protection
orders99 and to supply bases for criminal prosecutions of violators of certain
of those orders.1" Federal law thus augments state work on the miseries of
some families' lives, helps to provide shelter and counseling, supports state
and tribal police and prosecutors, and brings needed dollars and attention to
this arena. Arguably, even the defeat of the civil rights remedy has been
productive. After Morrison, some municipalities and states have tried, in
the words of the New York City Council, to fill the "void" left by the
Supreme Court by enacting comparable provisions.''
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg, 10409(a), 10416 (1994); Violence Against Women Act of 1999,
Stalking Prevention and Victim Protection Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22-37 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 VAWA
Hearings) (statement of Bonnie Campbell, Director of the Department of Justice's Violence
Against Women Office).
98. The Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 2000 Legislative Summary: Anti-Crime Package, 58
CQ WKLY. 2914 (2000) (describing the authorizations of almost $3.3 billion for grants, including
$185 million a year for five years for state programs to coordinate victim advocates, police, and
prosecutors, $175 million a year for five years for shelters for battered women and children, $40
million for a new program providing legal assistance to battered women, and $25 million for a
new program to assist women in obtaining transitional housing).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
100. Id. § 2262 (prohibiting the crossing of a state line with the intent to engage in or actual
engagement in conduct that violates a protective order). This provision was upheld in United
States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Casciano, 124 F.3d 106 (2d
Cir. 1997). Also authorized is prosecution if a defendant crosses a state line with the intent to
commit or in the act of committing a crime of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 2261. This
provision was upheld in United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1020 (1999). As of 1999, more than 170 prosecutions had been pursued. 1999 VAWA
Hearings, supra note 97, at 32-33 (statement of Bonnie Campbell, Director of the Department of
Justice's Violence Against Women Office). In 2000, more than 230 criminal cases were filed
under the various criminal provisions of VAWA. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Criminal Caseload Statistics, Violence Against Women (2001) (on file with author).
101. E.g., NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §§ 8-901 to -905 (2001) (providing a
civil cause of action for any person committing a "crime of violence motivated by gender" and
authorizing compensatory and punitive damages, injunctions, and fees). The Act addresses
"crime[s] of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in
part, to an animus based on the victim's gender" but not "random acts of violence unrelated to
gender or... acts that cannot be demonstrated, by preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated
by gender." Id. Parallel provisions have been proposed in other municipalities, as well as in the
states of Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, and New York. E.g., S.B. 1550, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2001) (providing damage actions when acts of violence are "motivated by gender," as
established by a "preponderance of the evidence," but not if "random"); The Arkansas Violence
Against Women Act of 2001, H.B. 1691, 83d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2001) (providing for
protection of the "civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and ... promot[ing] the
public safety, health, and activities by establishing a state civil rights cause of action"); Gender
Violence Act, H.B. 3279, 92d Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2001) (providing that because "[e]xisting State
and federal laws do not adequately prevent and remedy gender-related violence, such as domestic
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Let us thus call VAWA a regulation of the family (or more
appropriately, of dissolving or disabled families) and applaud it. But, in
contrast to the Morrison majority's proffered logic (if a law is "about
families," then it is beyond the authority of Congress), placing a law within
that category does not preclude federal legislation. In fact, upon entering
the categorical box of the family, one finds a great deal of federal law
inside.
1. Federal Laws of the Family
That federal law should speak substantively about, impose requirements
upon, and offer protection to family life is an artifact of this country's
founding, expressed periodically during the nineteenth century through
federal legislation using marriage policy to limit polygamy, to establish
rights of freed slaves, and to distance Indian tribal members from their
communities."°2 During the twentieth century, action on this federal front
(like many others) expanded. Interest in developing federal family law
stemmed from several factors including an increasingly mobile population,
economic crises clarifying the relationship between individual
circumstances of poverty and national markets, waves of immigration, and
comparative data that the United States lagged behind other nations in
addressing infant mortality and children's health.0 3 As a consequence,
contemporary federal family law is a m~lange of national norms aimed at
affirming certain conceptions about how families are constituted, what
violence, which is disproportionately visited upon women by men; sexual abuse, which harms
many women and children without being reported or prosecuted; and violence against men and
women for actual or attributed sexual or gender nonconformity," persons subjected to such sex
discrimination have civil causes of action for monetary and equitable relief); The Gender Violence
Act, H.B. 4407, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2000); An Act To Amend the Civil Rights Law,
in Relation to Providing a Civil Remedy for Victims of Bias-Related Violence or Intimidation,
S.B. 2776, 224th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (providing remedies for injuries based on gender
and sexual orientation and authorizing civil suits to be brought by both the attorney general and
individuals).
102. See NANCY CoTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9-23,
115-31 (2000); PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES (1997); Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999); Jill Elaine Hasday,
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998); Judith Resnik,
Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671
(1989).
103. An increasingly rich literature analyzes the effects of social policy on gender and
gender's role in shaping policy. Several scholars address the period of interest here. E.g., ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001); ALISA KLAUS, EVERY CHILD A LION: THE
ORIGINS OF MATERNAL AND INFANT HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE,
1890-1920 (1993); SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW
DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLmCAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 7-55 (1992); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 473 (1999).
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relationships within families have primacy, and the material consequences
of family life.
The legal routes to federal family lawmaking are-like federalism
itself-premised on a range of constitutional provisions including the
Commerce and Spending Clauses, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the
Fourteenth Amendment." 4  A brief sketch of some statutes and
constitutional law that create substantive federal family law policies
exemplifies the breadth. Federal tax law defines family units and creates
economic incentives for members. I 5 Social security law endows wage-
work with the power of enabling subsequent retirement benefits but treats
domestic production and reproduction differently." 6 Although state law
initially organizes assets between divorcing couples, "federal bankruptcy
law radically alters all the financial obligations created by state law." 107
Immigration law gives meaning to the act of marriage,"0 8 and the Defense of
Marriage Act defines it for purposes of federal law and interstate
obligations."° ERISA creates federal marital property law in pensions that
104. See Ann Laquer Estin, Shared Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States (Jan.
3, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (detailing the constitutional bases Congress
has relied on since 1974 to enact legislation aimed at family life, specifically spending powers for
many federal programs and regulations relating to child support, welfare, adoption, foster care,
and medical care; commerce powers for VAWA, child-support recovery legislation, abortion
clinic access statutes, parental kidnapping provisions, and prohibitions on discrimination based on
pregnancy; full faith and credit for child custody, support, and marriage legislation; and the
Fourteenth Amendment, also for VAWA, for transracial adoption legislation, and for proposed but
not enacted legislation on parental rights and freedoms).
105. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994) (defining "head of a household" for tax purposes); id.
§ 7701(a)(17) (defining husband and wife). Boris Bittker is one of the first within the legal
academy to have understood the role of tax law in family life. See Boris Bittker, Federal Income
Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975). Today, an extensive literature addresses
the effects of gender on the tax code and the tax code's effects on gender. See, e.g., EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997); NADA EISSA & HILARY WILLIAMSON HOYNES, THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND THE LABOR SUPPLY OF MARRIED COUPLES (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6856, 1998).
106. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989).
107. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 175 (2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASSI; see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 149-59
(1989) (examining federal bankruptcy law's effect on women filing singly). How bankruptcy
should treat child support debt is the subject of intense debate. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)
(1994) (not excusing debtors from child support and alimony debt), with Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. §§ 211-220 (2001)
(proposing a change).
108. Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that
drew a distinction in terms of citizenship opportunities between the children of unwed fathers and
the children of unwed mothers); see also Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg.
76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (addressing domestic abuse
and political asylum).
109. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999)) (defining "marriage" as between one "man" and one
"woman" for "determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
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trumps state property laws." In short, a variety of familiar areas of federal
law intersect with and regulate aspects of family life.
2. Supporting Children
Categoricalists define the care and economic support of children as
within the core of family law. I have therefore chosen it as an aspect of
federal family law to mine in more detail. Governments can facilitate
parental provision of care by a variety of methods, such as paying parents to
provide care to children, subsidizing care outside of homes, supplying food
and health benefits, and requiring employers to provide release time from
work. The choice of policy sustains or alters assumptions about the parental
roles and earning potentials of women and men. Further, given cultural,
religious, and ethnic variations in family patterns, governments also have
decisions to make about which individuals to recognize as constituting a
"family." 111 Thus, when governments impose obligations of child support,
their rules either reaffirm or disrupt extant understandings of family
constellations and gendered allocations of labor.
That state laws make such decisions is common ground. What the
Morrison majority ignored is that federal law also makes such decisions.
Federal social welfare legislation, sometimes assumed to have begun with
the 1935 Social Security Act, in fact was launched decades earlier, as Theda
Skocpol documents in her history of pensions provided for civil war
veterans and for mothers. Skocpol's titular delineation in Protecting
Soldiers and Mothers neatly encapsulates the prevailing gendered
assumptions, reinforced in part by what she terms "maternalist" social
policy." 2 Prompted by women's organizations seeking to reduce infant
mortality rates, the federal government created the Home Education
Division of the U.S. Bureau of Education in 1911, the Children's Bureau in
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States"); id. § 2(a)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (eliminating from the full faith and credit requirement the
recognition of same-sex relationships, entered into under the laws of one state, by other states).
Many commentators have addressed the legislation. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives To Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 745 (1995); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEx. L. REv. 921 (1998).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994); id. § 1056(d)(3)(D); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997)
(holding that these provisions preempt conflicting state community property rules).
111. See, e.g., WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND POLICY (Esther Ngan-ling Chow & Catherine
White Berheide eds., 1994).
112. SKOCPOL, supra note 103, at 525-39. Linda Gordon agrees, but then asks why such
programs "designed by feminists [were] so bad for women and children." LINDA GORDON,
PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 18901935, at
289-93 (1994) (discussing the "family-wage system," then supported by welfare reformists,
which limited possibilities for alterations in social ordering that would have been more generative
for women of all classes and races).
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1912, and the Women's Bureau in 1918,"' to provide "information,
investigation, and publicity." 14 By 1921, through the Federal Act for the
Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy (the
Sheppard-Towner Act, in force until 1929), federal funding provided more
than a million dollars to the Children's Bureau to disperse to cooperating
states for family care. 1 5
During the following seventy years of federal lawmaking, substantive
policies reflected and reinforced gendered assumptions about parental
responsibilities. Aid to (Families with) Dependent Children, a program
begun during the first half of the twentieth century, represented a federal
policy that mothers who lacked their own income or that of spouses should
be able to stay at home to care for children. Welfare legislation in 1996
illustrates a different federal policy: that such women should be prepared to
entrust their children to others and demonstrate their commitment to
gaining market employment."
6
Attitudes toward the roles fathers should play-in terms of both support
and care-have also shifted over the century." 7 As Linda Gordon explains,
in 1900 and in 1960, more than 85% of children lived with two parents." 8
Furthermore, "from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s, in all
classes, races, and ethnic groups, most single mothers were widows"-
77%119 By the 1930s, however, the proportion of single widowed mothers
had fallen to under 55%."o2 Men had left households but, with divorce
generally uncommon, desertion was the description.
The issue was what obligations these men had to those left behind. In
the 1930s and 1940s, state laws did not offer uniform answers on which
adult members of families were obligated to support children of what
113. SKOCPOL, supra note 103, at 304, 374, 480-81.
114. 43 CONG. REC. 2897 (1909) (statement of Rep. Herbert Parsons); see also id. at 2905
(explaining the federal role as "an aid" to states, not a "supplanter" of them).
115. SKOCPOL, supra note 103, at 481. See generally KLAUS, supra note 103, at 208-43
(describing the Children's Bureau during that time). When that statute was attacked as beyond
federal authority, the Supreme Court declined to address that claim on the ground that
Massachusetts lacked standing to bring it. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4
CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001) (urging revisiting of both issues).
116. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2129 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2), (g) (Supp. V 1999))
("It is the sense of the Congress that ... each State... assign the highest priority to requiring
adults in 2-parent families and adults in single-parent families that include older preschool or
school-age children to be engaged in work activities." ).
117. See generally David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and
Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2583-88 (1995) (discussing the
enforcement of child support).
118. GORDON, supra note 112, at 18 (stating that 9% of children lived with one parent in
1900 and 9.1% did so in 1960).
119. Id. at 19.
120. ld. at20.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2001]
The Yale Law Journal
ages121 and whether to pursue violators civilly or sanction them
criminally. 22 The variation became a subject of discussion among state
leaders, who attempted to create uniform laws' 23 but found themselves
unable to lower the costs of pursuit or to sustain interest in pursuit from
prosecutors in states distant from the particular families in need. 2"
Additional hurdles came from state courts unwilling to hold that judgments
for future payments from another state were enforceable under full faith and
credit requirements. 
125
With the creation in the 1930s of federal welfare benefits for needy
children came federal interest in ensuring that adult family members who
had the resources to pay child support did so. 1 26 The development of federal
policy stemmed from substantive visions about who constituted families,
about which adults had obligations to children, and about how to spend tax
dollars wisely. Federal family policy reflected gender-conventional roles
rather than attempting to alter norms of masculinity by promoting fathers as
121. For example, in some states, mothers-who, if married, had no rights to property-did
not have support obligations. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 4 n.9 (1981)
(quoting a 1979 Illinois case noting the "untraditional idea that the mother, as well as the father-
even where she is a noncustodial parent-may be obliged to contribute to the support of the minor
children"). States also had diverse rules on the obligations of step-parents and other relatives
toward children and on adult children's obligations toward parents. Id. at 38-44.
122. See id. at ix (noting that the 1934 American Law Institute's Restatement of Conflict of
Laws described child support as "of no special interest to other states" because such obligations
were not enforceable elsewhere).
123. New York State developed a prototype. See Uniform Support of Dependents Law, ch.
807, 1949 N.Y. Laws 1801 (repealed 1997). See generally WILLIAM J. BROCKELBANK,
INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT (THE RUNAWAY PAPPY ACT) (1960)
(discussing the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act). The statute was replaced by the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS §§ 580-101 to -901 (McKinney
1999). This revision was prompted in turn by the 1996 welfare reforms, discussed infra note 131.
124. One issue was the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over the alleged offender;
federal law did not recognize jurisdiction without physical contact (real or constructive) until
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Writing after International Shoe and
after California's enactment of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in 1951,
Albert Ehrenzweig explored yet other problems, including which state law applied, what
enforcement mechanisms such as contempt could be applied to enforce obligations, and how to
treat support orders subject to modification. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of
Support Duties: The Reciprocal Enforcement Act in California, 42 CAL. L. REV. 382 (1954).
125. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910) (holding that past-due alimony payments were
entitled to full faith and credit only if not subject, under the issuing state's law, to retroactive
modification); see also Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(challenging the relevance of finality to enforcement through full faith and credit). Justice Jackson
also wrote an essay arguing that national legislation should integrate legal systems, as it was doing
for the economy and social welfare. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers'
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. I (1945). Enforcement remained difficult in the
subsequent decades. See Duncan J. Stewart, Note, Domestic Relations: Interstate Enforcement of
Support Orders: Necessity and Feasibility of Federal Legislation, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 541 (1963).
126. Contemporary federal interest in child support enforcement remains linked to welfare
support. See 144 CONG. REC. S5734 (daily ed. June 5, 1998) (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl)
(supporting the 1998 amendments to the Child Support Recovery Act by noting that "[i]t has been
estimated that if delinquent parents fully paid up their child support, approximately 800,000
women and children could be taken off the welfare rolls").
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care providers. Fathers were identified as the primary wage earners;
mothers were situated as caregivers. For example, a 1932 federal law,
permitting only one person within a household to be in federal employ,
embedded the concept of the "family wage." The presumption of the man
as a family's wage earner can be seen from the fact that almost all of the
1500 people fired during the law's first year were women.12 7
Federal involvement in child support increased as federal dollars went
toward support of children and as state actors sought help in enforcement of
their collection laws. Initially, federal statutes focused on encouraging and
assisting state collection of child support from wayward fathers. Subsequent
federal regulation sought to take direct action against adults liable for
support,' 2 resulting in what some have termed "the federalization of child
support enforcement." 129 Through laws passed in 1968, 1974, 1984, 1988,
and 1996, Congress created a federal locator system and imposed federal
standards on how to search for absent fathers, how to recoup funds from
them, and how to assess how much to recoup from them.13 The 1996 Act
mandated adoption of uniform state laws on child support as a condition of
federal funds, resulting in state enactments that march to a federal drum. 13'
In terms of the content of federal policy, Gwendolyn Mink describes the
1996 legislation as representing a bipartisan agreement that "poor women
127. COTT, supra note 102, at 173 (discussing section 213 of the Economy Act of 1932,
repealed some five years later); see also ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE:
HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 57-80 (1990) (exploring the gendered
meanings of family "providers").
128. Chambers, supra note 117, at 2583-84.
129. KRAUSE, supra note 121, at 307-11 (discussing the creation in 1975 of the Office of
Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); Ann
Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 541, 545 (1998).
130. Legislation enacted in 1965 and 1967 authorized agencies of the federal government
(such as the Internal Revenue Service) to provide states with addresses of absent parents. Social
Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 340, 79 Stat. 286, 411 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994)); Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 211, 81
Stat. 821, 896-97 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 622). Subsequent amendments
expanded the obligations of states and the oversight role of the federal government. Family
Support Act, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2351
(1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660); Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,
ub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1306 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667); Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2408 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 617, 668-669, 681-687,
1396r-6). Revisions of those provisions came through the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), which requires participating states to
establish paternity and to enforce child support obligations by deducting payments when a
custodial parent refuses cooperation. For discussion of the evolution of laws and practices, see
generally CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds.,
2000); and Estin, supra note 129.
131. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 666 conditions the receipt of federal funds on state efforts to
locate absent parents and details the procedures that need to be in force. Simons, supra note 62, at
94041 n.2 11 (describing the effects of the federal legislation on state lawmaking).
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with children should at least be financially tied to their children's biological
fathers, or better yet, be married to them." 132
Federal criminal law can also be a vehicle for national norms. During
and after World War II, federal legislators began to consider what became
known as the "Runaway Pappy Act" -a version of which was championed
in the late 1940s by then-Representative Gerald Ford."' Proponents sought
to craft.a federal crime based upon a father's willful departure from a state
to avoid child support obligations." 4 They argued for federal lawmaking
because (1) during World War II, the federal government had contributed to
the problem by encouraging fathers to leave their households to work in
factories or to go to war; (2) state laws varied, and interstate enforcement
was expensive and sometimes unavailing; and (3) by moving from state to
state, fathers could avoid obligations of support. 135 Some of the proposals
would have permitted direct prosecution and imposed criminal penalties,
while others sought to deploy the federal courts as a registry for interstate
support orders and therefore as a means of enforcement for moneys due. In
the legislative records of the many bills, proponents did not evidence
concern about the constitutional vulnerability of their proposals. Long
before the 1960s interpretations of Commerce Clause powers, members of
Congress assumed that obligations for child support had a sufficient nexus
to the economy to support federal legislation, 13 6 which was welcomed by
state officials seeking federal assistance. 37
132. Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 80 (2001); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 107, at 174 (discussing how marriage permits coinsurance by partners
and how "the trilogy of marriage, divorce, and no remarriage... correlate[s] with financial
ruin").
133. H.R. 1538, 81st Cong. (1949). Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas first proposed such a
bill in 1941 and twice thereafter. See S. 1265, 77th Cong. (1941); S. 761, 78th Cong. (1943); S.
453, 79th Cong. (1945).
134. See, e.g., S. 1265 § 2(a). The bill proposed that:
Any person being subject to a judgment or decree of a court of any State for the support
of his or her minor children, any part or installment of which is due or unpaid, who
shall, without first reporting to the court entering such judgment or decree .... transfer
or remove his or her residence from such State with the intent to avoid payment of such
judgment, shall be guilty of a crime against the United States.
135. See, e.g., Making Abandonment of Dependents a Federal Crime: Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. (1949-1950) [hereinafter 1949-
1950 Abandonment Hearings].
136. Little in the legislative hearings addressed the issue. The Chair of the House
Subcommittee, Sam Hobbs, directed a witness by commenting, "What we are interested in is not
so much the question of the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. We recognized that in the
Lindbergh Act, in the Mann Act, and in the more recent developments along that line." Id. at 37.
The Department of Justice also advised that the "instant measure is probably constitutional by
virtue of' the Commerce Clause. Id. at 117 (reproducing Letter from the Office of the Assistant to
the Attorney General, Department of Justice to Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee on
the Judiciary (July 1, 1949)).
137. For example, the Council of State Government and the State of Indiana endorsed the
1949 bill proposed by Representatives Ford and Jacobs. See id. at 9 (statement of Rep. Andrew
Jacobs). State attorneys general remained supportive of federal action, as commentary in the
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As is familiar to those who focus on either family law or federal
jurisdiction, the criminal legislation (the Child Support Recovery Act of
1992, or CSRA)'38 became law decades later, by which time "runaway
pappys" had became "deadbeat dads." '139 Together, whether wisely or
not, '4 both civil and criminal federal statutes focus on collecting child
support payments from fathers. Less familiar is that major opposition to the
deployment of federal legal resources for these efforts came from the
federal judiciary itself."' At first, objections came through commentary
from the official voice of the Article III judiciary. Between 1958 and 1992,
the Judicial Conference opposed all of the many proposals for federal
jurisdiction for either the registration in federal court of support orders or
criminal sanctions.142 The Conference argued that the various bills were ill-
1980s from Connecticut's then-Attorney General indicated. See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD
SUPPORT IN AMERICA 91 (1986) (praising the effectiveness of federal child support legislation).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). This Act was amended by the Deadbeat Parents Punishment
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618; see supra note 60 for its provisions and notes
64-65 and 70-72 for litigation about its constitutionality. Earlier versions included H.R. 1, 92d
Cong. (1972), which would have amended the Social Security Act to make a federal crime of the
failure by any parent "under a legal duty to provide for the support" not to pay if the
"child... receive[s] assistance payments... funded... in part... by the Federal Government."
S. REP. No. 92-1230, at 859 (1972).
139. See Mary Jo White, Collecting Child Support Is a Federal Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1995, at A15 (discussing, in her capacity as United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, the arrest of a "deadbeat dad" in Vermont on charges of owing in excess of $500,000
in child support). In 2000, some 450 cases were filed nationwide. Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Caseload Statistics, All Child Support Recovery Act
(2001) (on file with author).
140. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 117, at 2584, 2588-605; id. at 2588 (noting that "more
fathers pay more money than ever before, but half of all children with an absent parent still
receive no support"). Chambers argued that these obligations might prompt the poorest fathers to
avoid relationships with their children, and that some children would be better served if they had
no relationship with fathers who were abusive to either the custodial parent or the child. Id. at
2602-05; see also Susan Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement, 8
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657 (2000) (exploring how child support enforcement policies
reduce the safety of both women and children); GORDON, supra note 112 (criticizing the focus on
privatization of support for reinforcing hierarchies based on gender, race, and class and thus
reiterating political stratification and supporting state-provided minimums or universal programs);
ROBERT I. LERMAN & ELAINE SORENSEN, CHILD SUPPORT: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC TRANSFERS 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8199, 2001)
(arguing that legal child support obligations are more efficient when custodial parents live
together since when parents are apart, the noncustodial parent has less control, prompting a
decline in investments).
141. The Department of Justice, on behalf of the FBI, also raised objections about the
deployment of federal resources for this problem. See, e.g., 1949-1950 Abandonment Hearings,
supra note 135, at 36 (statement of Rep. John A. Carroll) (addressing the need to convince the
FBI of the propriety of such federal legislation).
142. See 1957 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 37; 1959 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 35, 316-17; 1963 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 73; 1965 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17, 63; 1967 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 21, 68-69; 1971 REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 80; 1977 REPORTS OF THE
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advised, a misuse of federal power in matters that would be best left to the
states. (In contrast, the Conference has often declined to comment on
proposed bills on the ground that such issues were matters of "legislative
policy." )143 Subsequently, the Supreme Court has registered its objections
to federal court involvement in family life in other forms, such as by
declining to interpret legislation to endow individuals with rights of
enforcement' and by imposing restrictions on jurisdictional provisions that
could have enabled litigants to file family-related claims in federal court. 4 '
Most recently and vividly, as in Morrison, judges have held that Congress
has no power to vest certain matters in federal courts.146
These exchanges represent a long history of the judiciary and Congress
debating-and disagreeing about-the shape of federal family-law policies
and particularly about whether Congress could or should enlist the federal
courts in implementing its laws.'47 Such debates are themselves further
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 53; 1992 REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 57. Similarly, the Judicial
Conference initially objected to enactment of the civil rights remedy in VAWA. See Resnik, supra
note 92, at 271-72.
143. For examples, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming
the Meaning ofArticle 1I1, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924,961-67 (2000).
144. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1996); Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347 (1992);
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). See generally Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of
the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 845 (1992) (discussing the
intractability in a federated system of the problem generated by conflicting laws on child custody,
and criticizing statutory and judicial responses).
145. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (holding that the federal courts
do have jurisdiction for alleged abuses of children by a father and his female companion but
reading the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), as incorporating a "domestic
relations exception" for cases involving divorce, child custody, and alimony); Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982) (holding that the habeas
statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254, cannot be used to challenge a state law under which parents lost
custody); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (requiring abstention when pending state
proceedings were underway); Martin Guggenheim, State Intervention in the Family: Making a
Federal Case Out of h, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1984) (detailing the use of procedural doctrine to
bar "access to federal courts on issues of child protection"). When an issue is about "family" and
when a constitutional question dominates is itself an interesting example of shifting forms of
categorization. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (stating that had
the issue been only one of "zoning," local law might have had precedence but because the
question also implicated claimed discrimination against family clusters, federal constitutional
norms applied).
146. This jurisprudence protects the dockets of federal courts but is often justified as
protecting states from federal "intervention." Unless, as some advocate, the constriction of
Commerce Clause powers is followed by a parallel retreat on Spending Clause authority,
Congress retains power to frame programs that could be seen as more "intrusive" on states than
are commerce-based federal causes of action such as that struck in Morrison. See Estin, supra
note 104.
147. Elsewhere, I have explored the legitimacy of the federal judiciary having any such
collective view at the nonconstitutional level and its effects on constitutional interpretation.
Resnik, supra note 92, at 276-80. Other commentators question the wisdom of the particular
federal policies crafted. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context:
Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189 (1999); Sylvia Law, Families and
Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175 (2000); sources cited supra note 140.
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testaments that federal statutory family policies are plentiful and well-
known to federal judges. Through a range of civil and criminal statutes
enacted under Spending and Commerce Clause powers, Congress has
developed a regulatory regime reflecting substantive decisions about family
policy, only some of which involve rights of action in federal court. Within
the category of the family can be found federal regulation, and within the
category of the federal can be found rules of family life.
3. Superintending States
Morrison might be read as signaling more-that all such legislation
will soon fall because it invades the "truly local" province of the family.
But Congress is not the only source of federal law relating to family life.
When one turns from statutes to the Constitution, one finds that the federal
judiciary is itself a font of federal family lawmaking.
The word "family" does not itself appear in the Constitution. The
concept is only mentioned by way of prohibitions on forms of
intergenerational inheritance: No titles of nobility may be passed from
parent to child, nor shall the treasonous acts of ancestors result in penalties
to children by way of "corruption of blood." 148 Yet Supreme Court Justices
have regularly understood that they have the power to speak about families.
As we learned in June of 2000, for example, the Constitution has an
affirmative vision of family life. In Troxel v. Granville149 (popularly styled
the "grandparents' visiting rights" case), the Supreme Court held that the
State of Washington could not constitutionally confer on judges the ability
to order that a range of persons other than legal parents be able to visit
children. Not one of the briefs filed in Troxel argued that the United States
Constitution did not speak to family life. 5 ' Only Justice Scalia's dissent
claimed that federal law had no role in correcting what he saw as a
misguided provision."' In contrast, his colleagues (through five opinions)
all agreed that the Constitution applied, although they disagreed about what
flowed from its deployment.
52
148. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. States are also barred from conferring
titles of nobility. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Kris Collins, Framers and the Family Revisited (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that federal constitutional law at its
inception embodied national norms of inheritance).
149. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
150. Troxel (No. 99-138), 1999 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 138. Sixteen amici briefs were filed; the
organizations included the ACLU, the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution, the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the AARP, and the National Conference of State
Legislatures.
151. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that the power which the
Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view)
infringe upon what is (in my view) an unenumerated right.").
152. Exactly what rule emerged from the decision is unclear. Both the plurality opinion by
Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter's concurrence stressed the parental right to direct a child's
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Troxel does not stand alone. From the 1920s forward, Justices have
articulated federal constitutional norms regarding families, including that
legal parents are protected from state intervention absent compelling
evidence'53 and that they have various forms of control over their children
such as direction of their education."M Similarly, federal constitutional law
has bounded state rules on marriage and sexuality (by banning race-based
marriage barriers, by prohibiting polygamy, and by permitting
contraception') and on child custody, 5 6  as well as prohibited
discrimination based on whether parents were married at the time of a
child's birth." 7 Given the many cases that address the parental status of
men, "'58 the Court could even be understood as specializing in the law of
fatherhood.
My claim is not that federal law, statutory or constitutional, specifically
regulates all aspects of family life but rather that denominating an issue as
about family life has not precluded federal legal regimes from imposing
obligations, structuring sanctions, and creating incentives among
individuals designated to be family members. Even in areas such as
marriage, divorce, alimony, and child custody, which are often listed as
comprising the set of "domestic relations" within the aegis of state law, 159
upbringing without oversight from judges. Id. at 65-66 (plurality opinion); id. at 77-78 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas's concurrence argued that any legislation limiting parental rights
should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's dissent,
id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting), focused on the child's best interests, whereas Justice Kennedy's
dissent argued for judicial authority and restraint, with attention paid to the particulars of
individual situations, id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing the "fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"), cited in
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion).
154. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390,401 (1923).
155. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning a ban on racial intermarriage,
which sixteen states then prohibited and punished); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14
(1946) (upholding federal prosecutions based on polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) (sustaining a federal conviction for bigamy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(invalidating a ban on the sale of contraception).
156. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (prohibiting reliance on a parent's interracial
marriage as grounds for assigning custody to the other parent).
157. N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
158. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding constitutional a
presumption that a man married to a woman is the father of the child); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S.
1 (1981) (requiring state funding for required paternity tests if the alleged father is too poor to
pay); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (finding New York law violative of the Equal
Protection Clause because unwed mothers but not fathers could withhold consent to adoption);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (concluding that a state's differential treatment of the
rights of divorced biological mothers from biological fathers vis-i-vis adoption of a child did not
violate equal protection); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that states must give
unwed fathers hearings on their fitness before removing children from their custody).
159. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a
Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984); Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law,
Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994).
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federal law plays an important role. Indeed, for divorcing couples with
certain forms of income, the federal rule on spousal pension rights is central
to the division of assets. For couples at lower income brackets, federal
welfare laws structure economic options, and, as federal funding
diminishes, federal child support obligations become all the more central. 1"
Moreover, international law is playing a growing role in family life as
conventions related to children gain adherents and as parents in conflict
transport children across national boundaries. 6'
Similarly, describing problems as "criminal" -a category also invoked
in passing by the majority decision in Morrison and more extensively in the
Fourth Circuit's decisiont6 2-- does not preclude congressional power to
legislate. Given that prosecutors rather than victims bring criminal cases,
the majority's reference to criminal law in conjunction with the civil rights
remedy in VAWA was more of a reach than relating the statute to family
law. But embracing rather than contesting the category criminal does not
result in a descriptive conclusion that federal law must be silent. Rory
Little, John Jeffries, John Gleeson, and Daniel Richman, among others,
have detailed the overlap between state and federal law enforcement.'63
How much crime should be "federalized" is a contemporary subject of
debate;"6 that certain crimes are beyond federal law is a proposition
established by Lopez, but that crime as a category is beyond federal
jurisdiction is not a statement that any description of the United States's law
can support.
In the areas of both family life and crime, state systems currently bear
the brunt of dealing with the volume of disputes. But state courts do more
of the work for all forms of disputes. Federal filings (of some 300,000 civil
and criminal cases annually) are a small fraction of the thirty million
disputes brought annually to state courts.16 5 To use (or to fear) quantities of
160. LERMAN & SORENSEN, supra note 140, at 45.
161. Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a Quest for Policy, 33
FAM. L.Q. 843, 851-52 (2000); Merle Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and
Progress: Driving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Forward with Purposive Analyses, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
162. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13, 617 (2000); Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 838-42 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
163. A range of federal criminal statutes interact with comparable state provisions; local and
federal law enforcement officers often work together, sometimes through cross-deputization. See
Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1061-70 (1995);
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of
Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (1995); Daniel C. Richman, The Changing
Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, 2 CRIM. JUST. 81 (2000).
164. See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (James A. Strazella rptr., 1998);
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for
Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1227 (2000).
165. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 25 tbl.C-1 (2000); Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, Examining the
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work stemming from legal regulation as the basis for reading into the
Constitution a prohibition on federal lawmaking gives judges arbitrary and
unaccountable power. Calling VAWA a family and criminal law statute
does not provide an argument about why Congress could not act. Rather, the
interacting legal regimes in these arenas demonstrate the prevalence, in
practice, of multi-faceted federalism.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE INJURIES OF VIOLENCE:
GLOBAL COUNTERPOINTS AND "LOCAL" ANXIETY
The layers of lawmaking related to violence, family, crime, and
equality go beyond state and federal law within the United States, as the
problem of violence against women has become a topic for lawmakers
worldwide. Beginning in the late 1940s with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,166 international treaties recognized women's equality. More
recent enactments (such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 67 the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, 168 and regional agreements 169 ) expressly address
women's right to physical safety. Indeed, in the Morrison litigation, a group
of human rights scholars argued that Congress had the power to enact
VAWA as part of its obligation to implement the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (which the United States has ratified 7 ') and to
Work of the State Courts, 1999-2000, at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/divisions/research/csp/csp-
stat0 .html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001) (reporting more than fifteen million civil, fourteen million
criminal, and five million " domestic" filings). The evaluation shifts somewhat if, on the federal
side, the many bankruptcy and welfare benefit disputes related to "domestic relations" law are
included. For example, about 1.2 million nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions were filed in 2000,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra, at 94 tbl.F-2, and the Social Security Administration
decided more than 500,000 cases annually, Soc. Sec. Admin., About SSA's Office of Hearings
and Appeals, at http:llwww.ssa.gov/ohaloverview.htm (last modifed Mar. 9, 2000).
166. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE
NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
167. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered info force Sept. 3, 1981); see infra notes 186-190, 223-238
and accompanying text.
168. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 11, U.N. Doc. A/Rcs/48/104 (1994).
169. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, art. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1534, 1536 ("Every woman is entitled
to the free and full exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights ... [and
signatories] recognize that violence against women prevents and nullifies the exercise of these
rights."). See generally Claudio Grossman, Domestic Violence in International Law and the Inter-
American System, in U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, Div. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
WOMEN, BRINGING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW HOME 50, U.N. Sales No. E.00.IV.3
(2000) (providing an overview of international agreements addressing such violence).
170. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC.
DOc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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enforce customary international law that freed women from violence based
on gender bias. 7 '
Also beginning in the 1940s, politicians in the United States opposed
such transnational lawmaking as a threat to this nation. They relied
specifically on states' rights as an argument against participation in the new
human rights laws.'72 Transnational efforts to define equality are therefore
relevant in two respects to the contemporary invocation of categorical
federalism. First, an overview on gender equality elsewhere makes plain
how much at odds the Morrison majority's response is with lawmaking in
other countries, acknowledging the links among women's safety, equality,
family roles, and economic capacity. Second, the existence of these new
definitions of women's rights reveals yet another function of categorical
federalism-its role in attempting to buffer the United States from the
effects of lawmaking beyond its borders.
A. Developing Human Capabilities and Creating Legal Innovation
The harms suffered by women have become a subject of study around
the world. Illustrative is an international survey, Domestic Violence Against
Women and Girls,73 issued by UNICEF in June of 2000. This report
concludes that violence against women is "one of the most pervasive of
human rights violations, denying women and girls equality, security,
dignity, self-worth, and their right to enjoy fundamental freedoms."' ' 74
While noting that most countries prohibit such violence, the report finds
that violations are common and are often
sanctioned under the garb of cultural practices and norms, or
through misinterpretation of religious tenets. Moreover, when the
violation takes place within the home, as is very often the case, the
abuse is effectively condoned by the tacit silence and the passivity
displayed by the state and the law-enforcing machinery.Y
5
Indeed, although the "family is often equated with sanctuary," the
family "is also a place that imperils lives, and breeds some of the most
171. Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of the International Law Scholars and Human Rights
Experts in Support of Petitioners at 3-15, 22-30, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1037253.
172. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 76-77 (1990) (discussing the United States's
"deep isolationism" and fear of importing human rights).
173. UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS (United Nations
Children's Fund Innocenti Research Ctr., Innocenti Digest No. 6, 2000), http://www.unicef-
icdc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf.
174. Id. at 2.
175. Id.
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drastic forms of violence perpetrated against women and girls." 1' In
contrast to the jurisdictional lines drawn by the Morrison majority, the
UNICEF report refuses to bound its inquiry into the family, culture, and
religion.' Rather, the report identifies the systemic and widespread
practices of violence against women as predicated upon economic
dependency, acculturation to sex roles, and legal and political inequality.
Poignantly, "women's increasing economic activity and independence is
viewed as a threat which leads to increased male violence," particularly in
economies that are themselves in transition.178
International analyses also address "human capability," a term used to
denote a range of activities including but not limited to economic activity.
Since the early 1990s, the United Nations has provided an annual Human
Development Report with "balance sheets," listing a rise of women's
economic activity in the "progress column" and the high incidence of
physical violence against women by their intimate partners on the
"deprivation" side.'79 The variable of gender correlates with education and
poverty levels. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Deborah Jones Merritt explain,
for every one man who is illiterate around the world, two women are, 180 and
seventy percent of the world's poor are women. 1 ' Women's risk of
violence, their poverty, and their high illiteracy rates relate to women's
roles within families. The job of being a parent limits market options, as
does the danger of violence. Martha Nussbaum relies on such research for
what she terms a feminist argument that attends specifically to women's
status as "less well-nourished than men, less healthy, more vulnerable to
physical violence and sexual abuse." "'
176. Id. at 3. While violence against women crosses cultural lines, the grounds and sources of
injury reflect cultural patterns. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of
the "East" and the "Passion" of the "West," 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287.
177. See UNICEF, supra note 173, at 1 (commenting, in an opening editorial by Mehr Khan,
the Director of the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, "Women and children have a right to
State protection even within the confines of the family home").
178. Id. at 8.
179. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 22, U.N. Sales No.
99.III.B.43 (1999) ("Between 1990 and 1997 women's economic activity rate rose from 34% to
nearly 40%.... A quarter to a half of all women have suffered physical abuse by an intimate
partner."). Assessments of human security link economic and personal safety. Id. at 36.
180. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International
Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 257 (1999); see also U.N. DEv.
PROGRAMME, supra note 179, at 132, 138-41, 160-62, 229-41 (providing a "gender-related
development index" that includes measures of life expectancy, literary, and income); id. at 140
(reporting that, for example, in India, 39.4% of women are literate, as contrasted to 66.7% of
men). See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 191-203, 217-18, 225 (1999)
(elaborating the relationship among women's educational levels, fertility rates, and women's
economic, social, and political opportunities).
181. Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 180, at 257.
182. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH I (2000).
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The economic and sociological work is both a product and a source of
international efforts to obtain recognition of women's equality.'83 A series
of constitutional documents recognize women as rightsholders 84 Some
instruments make more wide-ranging commitments to action for achieving
equality than does contemporary equality law in the United States."B5 For
example, in 1979, the United Nations General Assembly promulgated the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). 86 Although signed by then-President Jimmy Carter in
1980 and adopted by more than 165 countries, the United States Senate has
not (yet) ratified CEDAW.is7 That Convention defines prohibited gender-
based discrimination to include "any distinction, exclusion or restriction
[that] has the effect or purpose of impairing women's and men's equality
and exercises of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Further,
CEDAW requires that:
State parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political,
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure the full development and
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on a basis of equality with men.'88
183. See LEILA J. RuPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1997) (providing a history beginning with the 1878 Congrds
international de droit des femmes, the first international women's congress, followed a decade
later by a conference called by the U.S. National Woman Suffrage Association, from which the
International Council of Women emerged).
184. See Nitza Berkovitch, The Emergence and Transformation of the International Women's
Movement, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875, at 100 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999); Elisabeth
Friedman, Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Annelise Riles, The Virtual
Sociality of Rights: The Case of "Women's Rights Are Human Rights," in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESS: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES (Michael Likosky ed., forthcoming
2001).
185. Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 180, at 273-81.
186. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 167; see Arvonne S. Fraser, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (the Women's Convention), in WOMEN, POLITICS, AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 77 (Anne Winslow ed., 1995). "CEDAW," technically the name of the
committee empowered with oversight of its deployment, is sometimes used as shorthand as is the
term "The Women's Convention." I prefer CEDAW because the term "The Women's
Convention" could be read to imply that other conventions, addressing political and civil rights,
economic rights, torture, and the like, are not also central to women.
187. See Comms. on Int'l Human Rights & Int'l Law, Recommendations on the Ratification
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 53 REC.
ASS'N BAR CITY N.Y. 511 (1998).
188. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 167, art. 3, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16. Article 5(a) addresses the need "[t]o modify social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women" to eliminate stereotypes; Article 6 calls on state
parties to reduce trafficking in women; Article 7 seeks women's equal participation in formulation
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The "appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination" may include
"temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality
between men and women"' 89-in United States parlance "affirmative
action." In the early 1990s, the committee superintending the Convention
issued a statement that its provisions include prohibitions on violence
against women, whether occurring in the family, the community, or other
institutions. 9 ' A year thereafter, the UN adopted a resolution addressing
violence against women.' 9
In addition to such transnational efforts, many countries have created
new laws and institutions aimed at undermining gender inequality. Political
governance is one arena of concern. Despite women's access to the vote,
women remain markedly underrepresented in most democracies. In
response, the European Union (EU) supports "parity democracy," by
which is meant the "balanced participation" of women and men at all
levels of government and in all commissions, committees, and councils of
the Community.'92 Concern that only small numbers of women served in
elected positions prompted France to enact legislation (the "Electoral loi of
6 June 2000") requiring that equal numbers of women and men candidates,
with equal placement on lists of candidates, be put forth for most
elections.'93 Some two dozen countries, including Argentina and South
Africa, have variations on this approach.19' Governments have also forged
new positions, such as the Ministry for Women established in Great
of government policy and for equal employment possibilities; and Article 16 seeks the elimination
of discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations. id. arts.
5, 6, 7, 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17, 20.
189. Id. arts. 2(e), 2(t), 4(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16. When equality is achieved, these Articles
are to be discontinued. Id.
190. General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, Comnuniee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, 1 th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
191. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 168; Radhika
Coomaraswamy & Lisa M. Kois, Violence Against Women, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 177, 182-84 (Kelly D. Askin & Doreen M. Koenig eds., 1998) (discussing
the history and content of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women);
Elissavet Stamatopoulou, Women's Rights and the United Nations, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 184, at 36 (providing an overview of the UN mechanisms for advancing
women's equal treatment).
192. Mariagrazia Rossilli, Introduction: European Union's Gender Policies, in GENDER
POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 18 (Mariagrazi Rossilli ed., 2000).
193. Noelle Lenoir, The Representation of Women in Politics: From Quotas to Parity in
Elections, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 217, 242-43 (2001); Suzanne Daley, Parity: Thy Name Is
Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 4, at 3. See generally SYLVIANE AGACINSKI, PARITY OF
THE SExES (Lisa Walsh trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) (1998) (analyzing the political and
philosophical complexities of the concept and practice of parity).
194. Eliane Vogel-Polsky, Parity Democracy-Law and Europe, in GENDER POLICIES IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 192, at 61; see, e.g., Alice Brown, Deepening Democracy:
Women and the Scottish Parliament, in REMAKING THE UNION 103 (Howard Elcock & Michael
Keating eds., 1998); Pippa Norris, Equality Strategies and Political Representation, in SEX
EQUALITY POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE 46 (Frances Gardiner ed., 1997).
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Britain.'95 That work is part of the effort to implement what both the EU
and the United Nations describe as "mainstreaming," 196 bringing questions
of women's equality into all policy areas and ensuring that all policies be
made with an awareness of their effects on women.
If one axis is political governance and participation, another is the
workforce and households. As Norwegian sociologist Arnlaug Leira
comments, "Mothers have changed the gender balance in breadwinning.
Changing the gender balance in caring may prove even more difficult." 1
97
In France, the thirty-five-hour work week has become mandatory for much
of the workforce, 98 in part to shift cultural patterns in which women
continue to take more responsibility than men for providing care to
children, other relatives, spouses, and themselves.' 99 In Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden, a portion of all parental leave is reserved to each parent as a
"non-transferable right" to prompt both mothers and fathers to take paid
time (including, in some instances, part-time) away from their
workplaces. 2°0 Further, in Sweden and Norway, benefits provided upon the
195. See BETTER FOR WOMEN, BETTER FOR ALL: FOURTH REPORT OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 2 (1999) (providing, as part of the filing
required under CEDAW, an overview of the Women's Unit in the cabinet created to ensure that
the "whole of Government takes into account women's needs and aspirations").
196. See MAKING WOMEN COUNT: INTEGRATING GENDER INTO LAW AND POLICY-MAKING
(Fiona Beveridge, Sue Nott & Kylie Stephen eds., 2000) (analyzing efforts at integrating gender
into policymaking in five EU countries). See generally Catherine Barnard, Gender Equality in the
EU: A Balance Sheet, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 215, 220-21 (Philip Alston ed., 1999)
(providing an overview of case law and legislation); Christopher McCrudden, Mainstrearning
Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1696, 1699-1701 (1999)
(examining efforts at enhancing equality).
197. Arnlaug Leira, Caring as Social Right: Cash for Child Care and Daddy Leave, 5 SOC.
POL. 362, 375 (1998). See generally PARENTAL LEAVE at x-xi (Peter Moss & Fred Deven eds.,
1999) (stating that, despite efforts to achieve gender neutrality, "women remain the
overwhelmingly dominant group among those taking leaves").
198. French Parliament Approves 35-Hour Working Week, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec.
16, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File (stating that the law applies to all
companies with more than twenty employees and, as of 2002, to all companies); see also Jeanne
Fagnani, Parental Leave in France, in PARENTAL LEAVE, supra note 197, at 69 (discussing how
leave policies may reinforce gender discrimination in labor markets).
199. See Deborah M. Figart & Ellen Mutari, Degendering Work Time in Comparative
Perspective: Alternative Policy Frameworks, 56 REv. SOC. ECON. 460, 462 (1998) (describing
Swedish feminists as among the first to propose "reductions in paid working time as a means of
redistributing domestic labor"). In the United States, women disproportionately bear the burden of
household work. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
200. Payment structures in countries vary, with some having "flat-rate allowances" and
"parental wages," and others replacing earnings at the same levels as unemployment or illness. In
terms of "take-up rates" (i.e. usage), the variables include the amount of economic benefit
provided, the existence of child-care providers, and the level of professionalism of women
workers. In Sweden, 450 days are paid from birth until a child is eight; 360 are paid at full salary,
and 180 extra days are provided per additional child. See Suzan Lewis, Janel Smithson & Julia
Brannen, Young Europeans' Orientations to Families and Work, 562 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCI. 83, 85 (1999); MINISTRY OF CHILDREN & FAMILY AFFAIRS, THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS
OF SMALL CHILDREN IN NORWAY (2000); see also Franqoise Core & Vassiliki
Koutsogeorgopoulou, Parental Leave: What and Where?, OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 1995, at 15
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birth of a child are reduced if both spouses do not participate by taking time
off from work.'Ol As Leira explains, "In the Nordic countries parental leave
is one element in more comprehensive legislation to promote gender
equality."20 2  Such provisions point to an appreciation that
"[i]ncreasingly, ... what differentiates gender roles is not whether
individuals have a job, but the amount of time spent in paid
employment." 203
A third focus is on women's lack of physical security. Although
VAWA's attempt to make certain assaults a breach of national norms did
not succeed in the United States, that approach is being adopted
internationally, as rape is comprehended-for the first time-to be a crime
against humanity, a war crime.2 "4 In the winter of 2001, an international
tribunal dealing with war crimes in the former territories of Yugoslavia
convicted perpetrators of such crimes. 211 This premise has also been
codified in the Treaty of Rome,21 "the first international treaty to recognize
(describing Belgium's "career breaks," available for up to five years and for needs unrelated to
children, and noting that the three-month leave associated with the United States is too short to
qualify as parental leave by some countries' standards).
201. In Norway, participation rates by fathers rose rapidly when the "use it or lose it"
provisions came into play. See Arnlaug Leira, Cash-for-Child Care and Daddy Leave, in
PARENTAL LEAVE, supra note 197, at 267, 275 (describing how, since the introduction of the
"daddy quotas," about seventy percent of eligible fathers in Norway have taken the leave); see
also U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 179, at 82 ("Fathers must use at least 4 weeks of the
parental leave" time of forty-two weeks at full pay or fifty-two weeks at eighty percent pay or that
period is lost.).
202. E-mail from Arnlaug Leira, Professor of Sociology, University of Oslo, to author (Feb.
9, 2001) (on file with author). Whether this strategy is successful is unclear. As Leira comments,
one small study of the use of "father's leave" indicated that while, in some families, it facilitated
a woman's return to the workforce, in others, fathers spent time at home but functioned as
"mothers' helpers." Leira, supra note 197, at 373-74.
203. Figart & Mutari, supra note 199, at 465 (discussing whether part-time employment
reinforces occupational segregation by gender and the debate among feminists about whether the
shorter work week promotes women's equality).
204. See Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War,
in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 184, at 197, 200-01 (explaining that, while
rape has been long prohibited, it was conceptualized as a dignitary rather than a violent injury and
was not listed under the Geneva Convention as one of the "grave breaches," a predicate to
universal jurisdiction); Dorean M. Koenig & Kelly D. Askin, International Criminal Law and the
International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes Against Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 191, at 3 (2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide,
and Women's Human Rights, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 183 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994); Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under
International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424 (1993).
205. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.un.orglicty/ind-e.htm; Marlise Simons, Bosnian
War Trial Focuses on Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at A4. For structural overviews of
legal efforts to redress gender-based violence in war, see generally Judith Gardam & Michelle
Jarvis, Women and Armed Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for
Action, 32 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2000); and Patricia M. Wald, Judging War Crimes, I
CHI. J. INT'L L. 189 (2000).
206. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.183/9, http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en-c.htm. As of November 1, 2001,
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a range of acts of sexual and gender violence as among the most serious
crimes under international law, 20 7 to be redressed in the International
Criminal Court.
This brief sketch highlights the degree to which male prerogatives to
run or to dominate governments, workplaces, households, international
relations, and war are being challenged through both texts and practices.
Globalism has helped to make plain the patterns of inequality. Technology
has enabled individuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
countries committed to diminishing such inequality to communicate with
each other. As a result, transnational understandings are developing that
reflect the degree of transformation needed for women to achieve equality.
Reorganization of all aspects of daily life, from homes to streets, markets,
and politics is required."0 8 Many of these remedial efforts are not continuous
with the political cultures in which they are placed but are disjunctive
interruptions of prior patterns. Illustrative is the change to democratic parity
in France; the "citizen" unmodified had been the tradition in French law
139 nations had signed and 43 had ratified the Treaty. Coalition for an Int'l Criminal Court, The
CICC International Criminal Court Home Page, http://www.igc.org/iccl (last visited Nov. 1,
2001). The United States became a signatory at the end of President Clinton's term, but many
within the Senate have opposed ratification. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. E13 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
2001) (reprinting an article, No to a World Court, submitted by Rep. Doug Bereuter of Nebraska).
The Bush Administration has announced its opposition. Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, U.N.
Funds in Crossfire over Court; Exemption Sought for U.S. Troops, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2001,
at Al.
207. Cate Steams, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 357 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (footnote omitted). Women are written
into the law of the court in three respects: as victims, as witnesses in need of specific services and
rules, and as judges and prosecutors. In terms of women as victims, see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 206, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi), 7(1)(g), 2(f), which
defines war crimes and crimes against humanity to include "[clommitting rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, [and] forced pregnancy." Specific reference is made to trafficking in
"women and children." Id. art. 7(2)(c). Targeted persecutions are defined to include those based
on "political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and gender" grounds. Id. art. 7(l)(h). In
terms of women as witnesses, see id. art. 54(1)(b), which provides that prosecution staff must
"respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses," including age and
gender; and id. art. 68, which states that the court must "protect the safety, physical and
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses." In terms of women as
judges and prosecutors, see id. art. 36(8)(a)(iii), which calls for state parties to take into account
the need for "fair representation of female and male judges"; id. art. 36(8)(b), which requires that
state selection processes "take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise
on... violence against women or children"; and id. art. 42(9), which requires the Prosecutor to
have advisors with legal expertise in "gender violence and violence against children."
208. See STEERING COMM. FOR EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN & MEN, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
THE STRATEGIES, ROLE, & FUNCTIONS OF NGOs WORKING FOR THE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY
BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN, PROCEEDINGS (1996); Shelly Inglis, Re/Constructing Right(s): The
Dayton Peace Agreement, International Civil Society Development, and Gender in Postwar
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 97-105 (1998); Afra Afsharipour, Note,
Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women's NGOs in the Enforcement of the Women's
Convention, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 129 (1999).
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until the recent enactments aimed at achieving parity for women and
men.
209
One cannot therefore dismiss cross-cultural comparisons as evidence
that some innovation, "natural to them," cannot provide insight "here."
Categories such as the family or war, previously used to preclude gender
equality norms from operating, are no longer understood as prior to and
thereby exempt from new rules and practices. Returning to the United
States, Morrison becomes remarkable not just as a "local" example of a
Supreme Court override but as parochial refusal to permit innovations
aimed at altering gender roles in the face of a national and growing
worldwide consensus that all social institutions require reconsideration in
light of knowledge of gender subordination.
B. Fears of "the Foreign" Within
These developments abroad illuminate another aspect of the appeal of
categorical federalism in the United States. Insistence on the "truly local"
as a jurisdictional limit underscores territorial boundaries in an effort to
defend against waves of transnational laws and increasingly homogenized
cultures. Categorical federalism therefore promises (or threatens, depending
on one's view) not only to limit (or undo) the New Deal, but also to
reinscribe isolationist foreign affairs policies aimed at returning the globe to
a description of the planet rather than a powerful presence within the
physical boundaries of the United States. Categorical federalism deploys
"the local" as if it is inevitably a site of participatory democracy that
protects some categories of human enterprise from distant power by safely
ensconcing them in decisional processes controlled by one's friends, one's
neighbors, and oneself.
Categorical federalism is thus specially responsive to the history of this
nation's birth in rebellion from a distant and centralized power. The central
gesture of the American Revolution-separation from King George-is
reenacted by claiming that "[t]he Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local,"210 thereby limiting
Washington's power. Moreover, a tenet of constitutional faith, that the
Constitution defines and confines all power, is invoked to justify the
Court's exercise of its own power. In addition, categorical federalism has
psychological appeal; "people often believe that there is an underlying
209. Proponents of the shift debate the degree to which it alters French law. See, e.g., Lenoir,
supra note 193, at 245, 247 (discussing those who see parity as making a fundamental change and
arguing that parity does not alter the universalism of citizenship but is a "tool," an "operational
mechanism... to ensure ... equal access to political responsibility," yet also noting that it is "a
sign [that France] is more open to the pluralism that it must itself incorporate").
210. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
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essence or reason for categories to be the way that they are."2 1 Categorical
federalism thus helps to cushion anxiety occasioned by dissolving
boundaries.
Working in conjunction with other precepts of current federalism
jurisprudence about the relationship between "the local" and "the
international," the boxes constructed through categorical federalism
become fortresses designed to ward off incursions not only from the
national government but also from abroad.2 12 This posture also has a
history. The claim that states' rights ought to preclude the application of
international human rights law was raised in the early 1950s, when, after
the creation of the United Nations and the promulgation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Senator John Bricker proposed a
constitutional amendment that would have limited federal treaty power if
deployed to undercut states' rights.2"3 According to one commentator,
"Bricker wanted to insure that international agreements would not lead to
United Nations interference or more liberal social and economic policies
and legislation in the United States." 2 14
Although the Bricker Amendment did not become law, some believe it
has become fact-through practices of the Senate that consistently limit the
application of international laws by reference to federalism. 15 For example,
when the Clinton Administration proposed that the Senate ratify CEDAW,
211. Spalding & Murphy, supra note 5, at 864 (discussing experiments attempting to locate
the role that background knowledge plays in influencing category representation).
212. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (arguing against participation
in a range of transnational agreements and against federal courts' application of those laws as part
of international customary law). But see Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American
Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9 (criticizing such
views).
213. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 98 CONG. REc. 908 (1952) ("No treaty or executive
agreement shall be made respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by this
Constitution .... ), reprinted in DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
CONTROVERSY 222 (1988). An alternative version read: "A provision of a treaty which conflicts
with this Constitution shall not be of any force and effect. ... A treaty shall become effective as
internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of
treaty." TANANBAUM, supra, at 91.
214. Id. at 31. Bricker had support from leaders of the American Bar Association, id. at 2-3 1,
and from a "coalition of Republicans and conservative, mostly southern, Democrats" who had
worked together against other legislative proposals, id. at 43. Proponents also included some
businessmen, who created the Foundation for Study of Treaty Law, some doctors opposed to
"socialized medicine," and Vigilant Women for the Bricker Amendment, fearful of the UN and
International Labour Organization's effects on the United States. Id. at 115-18. However,
disagreements about exact texts ensued, and President Eisenhower viewed the amendment as
unduly restrictive. Id. at 79.
215. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995); see also TANANBAUM, supra note 213, at 199-
203 (detailing how the Eisenhower Administration undermined support through practical
avoidance); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 515 (1991) (examining
the general question of treaties' domestic application).
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the executive also submitted "reservations, understandings, and
declarations" (RUDs)--caveats used in international treaty-making to
enable selective adherence to treaty provisions.216 The CEDAW RUDs
specified that the Convention's provisions would not be enforceable
domestically; that ratification would not result in "changing U.S. law in any
respect." " Further, in what is termed a "federalism understanding," the
RUDs specify that the allocation of power between state and national
governments would be unaffected.218 Parallel reservations accompanied the
United States's joining of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 219 and of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.2 0 Federalism concerns have also been
proffered as the rationale for the United States's refusal to ratify the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.22'
216. Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 55 (1997).
217. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 13 (1994) (statement of Jamison S. Borek,
Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State) [hereinafter CEDA W Hearings]. In contrast, in 1909,
when the Mann Act was pending, the participation by the United States in an "international
agreement for the suppression of the white slave traffic" was proffered as a reason to change
federal law by enacting those criminal provisions. See WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC, H.R. REP. No. 61-
47, at 3 (1909).
218. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-38 (1994). The report states that:
[T]he United States understands that the Convention shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered
therein, and otherwise by the State and local governments. To the extent that state and
local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government
shall, as necessary take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this
Convention.
Id. at 51. Discussion at the hearings indicated that, while the Convention could not be a vehicle
for federal legislation, joining the Convention meant conformance not only in arenas currently
subject to federal law. See CEDAW Hearings, supra note 217, at 11 (statement of Jamison S.
Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the
Proposed United Stlates Reservations to CEDA W: Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to
Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996). The Convention requires party states,
when filing reports, to discuss the status of such reservations. See Guidelines for Preparation of
Reports by States Parties, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 16th
Sess., U.N. Doe. CEDAW/C/7/Rev.3 (1996); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, ASSESSING
THE STATUS OF WOMEN: A GUIDE TO REPORTING UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (2000) [hereinafter
ASSESSING THE STATUS OF WOMEN].
219. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. The United States
ratified this convention in 1994. 140 CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (listing
caveats); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-29, at 24 (1994) (noting that the treaty does not
"federalize the entire range of anti -discrimination actions").
220. See 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992) (" mo the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to
the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may
take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.").
221. Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567,
574-75 (1997).
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States' rights are one set of prerogatives to be protected; gender roles
are another. Since the 1940s, the fear of international law undoing gendered
relationships in the United States has been express. The theme emerged in
hearings on the Bricker Amendment,222 and has now been put forth vividly
through a 2001 Heritage Foundation publication entitled How U.N.
Conventions on Women's and Children's Rights Undermine Family,
Religion, and Sovereignty.223  That monograph argues that the
implementation of CEDAW undervalues the nuclear family and marriage
by encouraging mothers to "leav[e] their children in the care of strangers
and enter[] the workforce."' 24 Complaining that the "United Nations has
become the tool of a powerful feminist-socialist alliance that has worked
deliberately to promote a radical restructuring of society," the monograph
calls on Congress to devote time and resources to protect against the
dangers the UN poses to sovereignty.22
These concerns about the influence of "foreign" ideas are based on
accurate appraisals of the capacity for ideas and practices to transcend
boundaries. But an assumption that bolstering states' and nations'
sovereignty could achieve safety from such influences is ill-founded. The
relationships among the local, the national, and the international are yet
more complex. Within the United States, localities are turning to
international law as a model for their own lawmaking. For example,
although the United States Senate has yet to ratify CEDAW, the City of San
Francisco has, making it a part of its local law in 1998.22 (Since then, the
city's Departments of Juvenile Services and of Public Works have filed
reports, as CEDAW requires on an international level, detailing the results
of "gender analyses" to understand the role of gender in their processes,
structures, and decisions.) 27 And, as of 2000, nine states, the Territory of
Guam, sixteen counties, and thirty-eight cities have enacted ordinances
calling on the United States to ratify CEDAW.2 8
222. See TANANBAUM, supra note 213, at 85 (citing testimony from a member of the
Chamber of Commerce opposed to the International Labour Organization's proposals for
provisions for mothers: "Had the founding fathers of the United States been thinking of compacts
regarding layettes and mothers' milk when they had written that treaties would be a part of the
supreme law of the land?"); see also supra note 214 (discussing the Vigilant Women for the
Bricker Amendment).
223. PATRICK F. FAGAN, How U.N. CONVENTIONS ON WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
UNDERMINE FAMILY, RELIGION, AND SOVEREIGNTY (Heritage Found., The Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 1407, 2001), http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bgl4O7.htm.
224. Id at 2.
225. Id. at 21.
226. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12K. 1 (2001), http://www.amlegal.com/sanfran/.
227. See S.F. COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND CEDAW TASK FORCE, A GENDER
ANALYSIS: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1999); S.F. CEDAW TASK FORCE, FOURTH PROGRESS
REPORT (2001), http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/cosw/cedaw/cedaw_5.htm.
228. Women's Inst. for Leadership Dev. for Human Rights, CEDAW Around the U.S., at
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/cedaw-around-us.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2001) (reporting
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The legality of local lawmakers engaging with international human
rights was also the subject of decisionmaking in 2000 by the United States
Supreme Court. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,229 the Court
imposed some limits by relying on the category of "the international" to
preclude certain forms of local innovation. In Crosby, commercial litigants
challenged a Massachusetts boycott on goods from Burma. In defense of its
policy, Massachusetts argued that its police powers supported its refusal to
spend state dollars on goods produced in violation of its local standards.
2 30
The Supreme Court held, however, that Massachusetts could not refuse
Burmese goods, because federal statutory provisions and executive actions
addressed the issue, preempting the state's rules."' The Burma boycott case
is thus an example of "the local" (Massachusetts) voluntarily allying itself
with "the international" (human rights law) and defining local obligations
in reference to international standards. Readers of that decision disagree
about the breadth of its import, with some claiming it illustrative of a
conventional preemption analysis and others understanding it to restate the
exclusivity principle that foreign affairs policy be made with "one voice,"
speaking from Washington. 2 However read, the local is constrained if not
prohibited when it seeks to play globally.233
on activity as of August 2000). The texts of these resolutions vary; some seek national ratification
while others also require local implementation. In addition, the Working Group on the Ratification
of CEDAW, co-chaired by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahai's of the United States
and the National Federation of Women's Clubs, is promoting national adoption of CEDAW. See
Tracey Parr, CEDAW at a "Local" Level 2-5 (Apr. 5, 2001) (unpublished memorandum, on file
with author).
229. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
230. Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Crosby (No. 99-474), 2000 WL 35850.
231. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380-81. Justice Souter filed the majority opinion. Justice Scalia,
writing on behalf of himself and Justice Thomas, concurred to protest the majority's mode of
interpretation through reliance on materials outside the statute's text. Id. at 388-91 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
232. Crosby has already proved to be a wellspring of scholarly debate. See, e.g., Jack
Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 177-78, 216-22
(reading Crosby as exemplary of a minimalist approach to statutory foreign affairs preemption);
Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 483, 494-501
(2001) (arguing that Crosby illustrates the Court's appreciation for the importance of executive
authority in foreign affairs). Both Mark Tushnet and Ernest Young read Crosby as evidencing a
presumption in favor of preemption in foreign affairs. See Mark Tushnet, Globalization and
Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11, 22 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Dual
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
139, 179 (2001). Young argues that such a presumption is unworkable in today's world of
overlapping boundaries, as was the earlier effort, described as "dual federalism," which was
aimed decades ago at making sharp delineations between state and federal powers. Id. at 177-78.
Other discussion about the desirability of federal control to enable "'one voice" in foreign policy
can be found in Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295; and Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70
U. COLO. L. REv. 1223 (1999).
233. See Org. for Int'l Inv., State and Municipal Sanctions Survey (Apr. 27, 2001)
(unpublished memorandum, on file with author) (reporting on a survey to learn of the effects of
Crosby and determining that a majority of responding localities had halted enforcement or
rescinded regulations as a consequence).
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But many of today's economic interactions do not track national
boundaries, a point powerfully illustrated by Crosby and well-known in
practice to consumers able to find the same commodities around the world.
Technology not only renders the local visually indistinct (as retailers,
products, and peoples reappear from site to site), but also enables nonlocal
participants to play major roles in "local" political practices.
Massachusetts's paper goods may come from Burma; its foodstuffs from
other places, its inhabitants from hundreds of countries, and the funds for its
political campaigns from people within and without the United States.234
Further, Massachusetts did not itself conceive of the idea of boycotting
goods made through forced labor. Its human rights ordinance was achieved
through a mixture of local, national, and transnational organizing efforts,
which Harold Koh terms "issue networks."" Such practices are not new.
Voluntary associations are often organized in layers (national, state, and
local) to link activists in this country and abroad. In the early part of the
twentieth century, for example, women's clubs in the United States
coordinated to help create "mothers' pensions."236 More recently, a wave of
local ordinances objected to apartheid in South Africa,237 as others have
sought to ban land mines23 and to enhance women's rights. This list does
not cover the spectrum of local ordinances, which range from expressive
efforts to seek social and political change at a national level (such as cities
calling for the ratification of CEDAW) to reliance on a locality's economic
or political power to produce immediate changes in practices abroad (such
as the provision at stake in Crosby) to the use of international exchange to
enhance a municipality's economy.
234. Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (discussing the benefits of local
governance). The classic argument is that a smaller unit permits more participation and enhances
the ability of individuals to have impact, a proposition in need of revisiting given the role of extra-
local organizations in making local policy. See Spiro, supra note 221, at 585-87 (discussing the
role Mexican commercial interests played after California enacted an anti-immigrant proposition).
235. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 9, at 649; see also BRIAN HOCKING,
LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY: NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AND MULTILAYERED
DIPLOMACY (1993) (analyzing such activities in Australia, Canada, and the United States and
describing the development as "multilayered diplomacy").
236. SKOCPOL, supra note 103, at 464-65 (detailing "deliberate, organized, state-by-state
efforts of associations of (mostly) married women" such as the National Congress of Mothers and
the General Federation of Women's Clubs).
237. See JANICE LOVE, THE U.S. ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: LOCAL ACTIVISM IN
GLOBAL POLITICS (1985); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an
Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813 (1986). In the
nineteenth century, localities also coordinated to lobby for shifts in national policy. See Kathryn
Kish Sklar, "Women Who Speak for an Entire Nation": American and British Women in the
World Anti-Slavery Convention, London, 1840, in THE ABOLITIONIST SISTERHOOD: WOMEN'S
POLITICAL CULTURE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 301 (Jean Fagan Yellin & John C. Van Home
eds., 1994); Joshua Civin, Civic Experiments: Community-Building in Baltimore and Liverpool,
1785-1835 (unpublished D. Phil. dissertation, Oxford University, draft 2001) (on file with author).
238. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 9, at 655-63 (detailing the process
by which "norm entrepreneurs" met, formed coalitions, and campaigned against land mines),
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These enactments might be read as demonstrating the genius of
rigorous enforcement of federalism boundaries, enabling experimentation
generated by varying legal regimes. But such an interpretation misses the
political purposes that are the predicates of localities' involvement with
labor standards and with CEDAW. Proponents' goals are to change local,
national, and international laws; their means deploy local actors working in
concert with outsiders. To conceive of local action as rooted in specific
conditions and indigenous to a particular place is to miss how often that
work is a product of broad efforts to shift social policy. New technologies
facilitate national and international campaigns by repeat-players, who
organize campaigns for issues from those as seemingly parochial as
elections of local judges... to those evidently transnational, sometimes in an
effort to generate universal human rights and other times horrifyingly to
destroy them. In short, not only does categorical federalism fail as a
description; it is unattainable as an aspiration. In contrast, multi-faceted
federalism provides the better account of the layers of political authority
now inevitably and sometimes uncomfortably present.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE INVENTIONS AND RISKS
OF MULTI-FACETED FEDERALISM
An absence of bounded categories may be unsettling but, in lieu of
(false) comfort, multi-faceted federalism offers something else, hopefully
more useful if less supportive. Under the rubric of multi-faceted federalism,
the deployment of categories is accompanied by a sense that they are
neither exclusive nor necessarily enduring. With an understanding that "the
local" and "the national" are not naturally bounded sites, multi-faceted
federalism serves as a reminder about how much work is required to make
democratic institutions accountable, at any level. The diminished clarity of
physical boundaries becomes an invitation to renew interest in the work of
local, subnational, and transnational structures, to interrogate current
practices, and to imagine new ones. Freed from a sense of siege and a desire
for fortifications, inquiry can proceed about the vitality of the United
States's institutions and the array of joint ventures that subnational
organizations have created.
How could federalism discussions change? First, United States history
ought to be retold to recognize the impressive contributions of local
political structures. Rather than reading this century as a triumph of the
239. See William G. Kelly, Selection of Judges, ABA JUD. DIV. REC., Winter 2000, at 3
(discussing the role of the Chamber of Commerce in elections of judges in different states);
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections 8 (2000) (unpublished paper
prepared for the Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, on file with author) (also discussing
efforts to influence state judicial elections).
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national on the one hand or as a narrow escape from federal overreaching
on the other,24 0 the persistence of local governance structures should be
highlighted. Take the example of Indian tribes, which, in the face of federal
efforts expressly aimed at "termination" of tribal identity, have had force
sufficient to require return of tribal artifacts and the fulfillment of treaty
obligations."' Consider also the powerful role of states and cities, which, as
demonstrated by the election of 2000, remain central players in national
elections. Not only have local forms proven to be notably resistant to
collapse through nationalization, they have also generated a range of
national but not federal institutions. Indeed, as Theda Skocpol comments,
the layers of federalism with its multiple sites of power create an
"opportunity structure" that has made the United States specially nurturant
to an array of associations."'
Thus, and second, we ought to pay more attention to the legal and
political import of the many forms of federalism extant within this country.
One important example is the interstate compact, which permits lawful
means for joint ventures between contracting states.243 A classical use of
compacts has been to resolve border disputes. But dozens of compacts now
do more, ranging from sharing natural resources2" to managing
transportation systems2 45 to administering economic programs." The use of
240. Compare Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that federalism's proponents cannot demonstrate
its utility and that the only purpose served by states is decentralization), with Daniel B. Rodriguez,
State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Normative Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523 (2000)
(addressing the vitality of state institutions and analyzing the function and role of state
constitutionalism).
241. See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
3013 (1994) (requiring inventorying of tribal materials and their return). In the 1870s, federal
policies allotted land to individual members of tribes in an explicit effort to diminish tribal
identity. Resnik, supra note 102, at 703. In the 1950s, the federal government again enacted
policies diminishing tribal identity. Id. at 727-28.
242. Theda Skocpol, The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy,
21 Soc. Sci. HIST. 455,472 (1997).
243. VINCENT V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: A STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT (1953); FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951); Kevin J. Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From
Cooperative State Action to Congressionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1985). Well over a hundred formal compacts (involving anywhere from two to fifty states, as
well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) exist. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS,
INTERSTATE COMPACTS & AGENCIES (1995).
244. E.g., Bear River Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-348, 72 Stat. 38 (1958); IDAHO CODE § 42-
3402 (Michie 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-16 (Supp. 2001); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-101 to
-102 (Michie 2001) (allocating water rights among Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming); see Jeffrey
Uhlman Beaverstock, Learning To Get Along: Alabama, Georgia, Florida and the Chattahoochee
River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993 (1998) (detailing the differing needs of Alabama and
Florida for clean water and of Georgia as a producer of pollution).
245. E.g., Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1 (West
1990 & Supp. 2001); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6401-6423 (McKinney 2000).
246. See, e.g., Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact, 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160 (2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.11 (West 2001); NEB. REV. STAT, § 44-6501 (1998); Wis. STAT.
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compacts increased during the twentieth century, and a greater number and
more varieties (including interstate agreements that do not result in formal
legal compacts) are likely in the coming years. 47
Attention to such agreements opens up possibilities for legislative
innovation. For example, why assume that a new cause of action for
VAWA victims could only exist in a state or a federal court? State court
systems might coordinate their responses to victims of gender-based
violence, as they already coordinate the movement and transfer of
prisoners,... and as they have begun to do in response to certain kinds of
multistate actions such as mass torts and consumer products litigation.
Further, in an array of such aggregate litigations (including a school
desegregation case in Baltimore, asbestos claims in New York, and
environmental injuries in Alaska), state and federal judges have crossed
jurisdictional lines to respond to shared problems.2 49 A comparable joint
venture, drawing on state courts' claimed advantages from working directly
with families in disarray and on federal courts' association with equality
law, could be forged to address violence against women.
In addition to prompting invention, awareness of interstate compacts
and judicial joint ventures ought to prompt sustained investigation into the
allocation of power within such agreements."' Who has decisionmaking
power? What patronage arrangements are facilitated? Should law and
policy create incentives for or strictures on making such accords?25' For
example, should multistate agreements be channeled through the compact
model, requiring congressional approval, or ought we be supportive of more
ANN. § 601.59 (West 2000) (involving Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, and Wisconsin, and
addressing issues of insolvency of insurance companies).
247. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 221, at 590-95 (discussing the possibility of states entering
into compacts or other agreements to adhere to international human rights provisions).
248. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-9 (1994).
249. See William W Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689 (1992);
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995),
reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 53, 81-99 (1995) (including a chapter entitled "Judicial Federalism"). In
addition, a newsletter entitled The State-Federal Judicial Observer, published from 1993 to 1998
by the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts, discussed these and other
efforts. See The State-Federal Judicial Observer, http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/
pages/178 (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).
250. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-71 (1978)
(discussing both the history and the Court's interpretation of the respective roles of the states and
that of the Congress in compacts); id. at 479-83 (White, J., dissenting) (same); Christi Davis &
Douglas M. Branson, Interstate Compacts in Commerce and Industry: A Proposal for "'Common
Markets Among States," 23 VT. L. REv. 133 (1998) (proposing three regions of the country in
which states should develop regulations of securities and corporations to reduce trade barriers);
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925) (calling for expanded attention to compacts and
discussing the development of their use in relation to regional hydraulic energy supply).
251. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 34-38 (1994) (denying
Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH), a
bistate body operating transportation systems in New York and New Jersey).
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diverse and less formal forms of such contracts? Should legal rules, such as
the presumptive longevity of interstate compacts and the current formal
barriers to joint venturing by state and federal judges, be restructured?
Compacts could be conceived either as threats to the intelligibility of states
or as a kind of "morphing" of states, in issue-specific arenas, to take into
account subject matters that do not track state boundaries. Responsive
policymaking ought to depend on a thicker understanding of the degree to
which formal compacts enhance the visibility and accountability of
governing structures, as well as better empiricism on the frequency and
form of noncompact multistate agreements. The central question is the
degree to which compacts enhance or impede democratic goals identified
with state-based federalism, including accountability and participation.25'
Third, as joint and interactive decisionmaking becomes the subject of
lawmaking, conflicts should be addressed under the rubric of preemption
doctrine. Given that state and federal laws address aspects of family law or
international relations, the issues become narrowed to whether, in a
particular circumstance, legal regimes can cohabit and whether one set of
rules needs to be set aside. These focused inquiries would require judges to
retreat from their forays into global political theory and thin historicizing.
Instead, they would have to detail how and why joint governance was or
was not possible in a specific context. Crosby, the Court's decision in the
Massachusetts Burma case, is exemplary of this preferable, albeit more
mundane and less powerful, role for judges, confined to discussion of the
degree to which redundant or overlapping governance can be tolerated in a
particular instance. That such decisions do not etch clear lines for all further
lawmaking becomes their virtue, as adjudication becomes appropriately
"local" in the sense of being limited by legal rules applied to discrete
factual circumstances." 3 Of course, preemption is not a magic bullet.
252. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The
Problems of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8, 24-26 (1997) (identifying a "democratic tension"
in compacts because, once they are approved by Congress, state governments are constrained in
making changes and arguing that compact agencies are "remarkably unconcerned about popular
needs and desires, even compared to state and federal agencies"). See generally JAMESON W.
DOIG, EMPIRE ON THE HUDSON: ENTREPRENEURIAL VISIONS & POLITICAL POWER AT THE PORT
AUTHORITY (2001) (providing history and analysis of the development of that interstate system).
253. Whether state and federal power exists to incorporate international norms has spawned a
good deal of debate. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347, 2350-71 (1991) (tracing the historical roots of federal common-law authority, the
retrenchment in the name of comity, and the resurgence of a judicial role in enforcing
international norms in domestic courts), with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815 (1997) (disagreeing with Koh's view). Implicit in my approach is that federal courts
have common-law-making powers, which could be exercised with deference to state courts. While
the federal judiciary should not see itself as specially disabled to engage in law application, state
courts can also serve as points of contact between international norms and domestic law. See
generally Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation
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Freewheeling Justices can impute intent to legislation and hence enhance
their powers, 4  but the methodology-examine statutes, apply facts,
presume concurrency-cabins the reach of even the adventuresome.
Fourth, in addition to looking within the United States to survey and to
analyze the range of federalism here, multi-faceted federalism may draw on
lessons from abroad. The challenges of coexisting and coextensive legal
regimes are common to all federations, which must address when to permit
shared "competence" and when to require preemption.25 5 While one cannot
transport one federation's solution to another, countries can learn of the
plausibility of particular delineations of authority. Take, for example, the
increasing and formalized position of NGOs in the United Nations, which
permits these nongovernmental groups to have a place in some official
meetings. 56 In 1948, 41 NGOs played an official consultative role; in 1993,
978 did so. 57 Scholars of NGOs argue that the increased prevalence of
NGOs should prompt a revision of theories about how authority and power
are exercised. 8 What role NGOs play in the United States has been given
of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (exploring the
legality of multiple venues for the domestic application of international human rights law).
254. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2445 n.8 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (complaining that
the majority's construction of the statute preempting state tobacco regulation was in tension with
the same majority's concern in Lopez for deference to state lawmaking); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 121
S. Ct. 1322 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempts a state law providing revocation upon divorce
of a designation of a spouse as a beneficiary of nonprobate assets); id. at 1326 (Breyer, J., joined
by Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that state and federal laws related to insurance and pension
benefits could coexist).
255. See David Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND THE E.U.
(Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., forthcoming 2001) (detailing "commandeering"
practices of Germany and the European Union and contrasting them with an anticommandeering
precept emerging in United States law, and arguing that overlap as well as distinctions exist);
GrAinne de Bdrca, Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance After Amsterdam (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). See generally David O'Keeffe, Exclusive, Concurrent, and
Shared Competence, in THE GENERAL LAW OF E.C. EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at 179
(examining the doctrine and texts delineating the competency of member states and the EU).
256. See, e.g., William R. Pace & Mark Thieroff, Participation of Non-Governmental
Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 207, at 391 (describing the coordinated work of the 236 accredited NGOs in the
negotiations for that court).
257. General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental
Organizations: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, Open-Ended Working Group on
the Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental Orgs., 1st Sess., Agenda
Item 3, U.N. Doe. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994); see also TWENTY-FIFTH UNITED NATIONAL ISSUES
CONFERENCE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND NGOs: NEW RELATIONSHIPS FOR A NEW ERA
(1994).
258. See John Boli, World Authority Structures and Legitimatization, in CONSTRUCTING
WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1995, supra
note 184, at 267 (analyzing the relationships between international NGOs and nations, ranging
from those working autonomously to those that work collaterally to those that "penetrate" and
alter state power). See generally Dinah Shelton, The Participation of NGOs in International
Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994) (focusing on NGOs taking on the role of
amici curiae in four permanent international courts).
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less attention. For example, might the National Association of Attorneys
General be understood as an NGO, representing segments of state interests
distinct from those presented through senators and members of Congress?
Should the work of a host of such organizations become a part of political
policymaking through formalized roles? What are the positive and the
perverse effects of commingling or disaggregating the idea of "state
interests" and states' decisional authority?25 9 In short, once willing to let go
of categorical federalism's strictures, opportunities for invention multiply.
The options are great because political practitioners are engaging in a range
of group-based actions, enlisting the local, state-level, national, and
transnational, the governmental and the nongovernmental, and whatever
other entities they can, all to bring them closer to whatever their aspirations
may be.
Fifth, multi-faceted federalism makes more difficult the valorization of
certain levels of government as specially able to get any particular social
policy "right." Take the claim that the "national" is a venue committed to
civil rights and that the federal courts are specially able to implement such
commitments. Relying on the symbolic capital of a link between national
lawmaking and civil rights, VAWA proponents argued that it was a
traditional function of the national government to protect equality and to do
so by vesting federal judges with jurisdiction.2' 6 But that "tradition" was
painfully incomplete when the country was founded, invigorated after the
Civil War, then dismantled, then renewed, and now called again into
question. The identity of the federal courts has shifted during the twentieth
century-at times courts have been seen to be institutions of oppression (by
labor and other populists) and at other times perceived to be institutions of
salvation (by civil rights claimants). Both state and national constitutions
speak of their commitments to equality, as do many other countries'
constitutions and many international declarations. But to embody equality
requires recommitment of national law in that direction, not simply the
259. The litigation of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), provides an example.
The statute at issue, on disposal of nuclear waste, had been enacted at the behest of the national
organization of state governors, who had drafted and lobbied for its passage. Subsequent political
problems within New York made difficult compliance with rules on locating disposal sites for
low-level nuclear waste and entering into compacts with other states to do so. See id. at 154. One
state's complaint was thus able to enlist the Supreme Court in undoing a bargained-for legal
regime, as discussed in Justice Stevens's dissent. Id. at 213 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Missed there,
as it was in Morrison, was the opportunity to develop doctrine on whether federal courts ought to
be more reluctant to act in the name of federalism when congressional action is based on demands
from specific kinds of state actors representing a majority of states.
260. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 23, United States v. Morrison, 523 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 95-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1037259.
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invocation of the nation as if it has intrinsically and inevitably allied itself
with practices of equality.1
6
'
To equate the "local" with progressive human rights movements would
also be erroneous. Above, I discussed a series of local innovations-
focused on forced labor, land mines, apartheid, and women's rights-
cheerfully allied with transnational human rights movements. But another
group of local activities in the United States stands in opposition to such
efforts and has been the brunt of targeted criticism from abroad. For
example, the "local" in the United States has insisted on its right to execute
individuals, juveniles included, despite transnational efforts to ban capital
punishment.26 The phrase "states' rights" has been a shorthand for
hostility to African Americans. Localities have also enacted ordinances
aimed at limiting rights of lesbians and gays and of immigrants. In short,
multi-faceted federalism counsels against assuming that either "the
national" or "the local" has an intrinsically rosy glow.
In parallel fashion, while CEDAW has been discussed as a powerful
example of the possibilities of transnationalism to improve gender relations,
neither transnational lawmaking nor globalism is necessarily an engine of
equality. Indeed, some current expressions of globalization do significant
harm to women. An oft-cited example is that offshore manufacturing is
made attractive by the unending supply of impoverished female workforces,
seeking to survive through a range of underpaid jobs.2 63 I claim no essence
for globalization but only its existence, in that physical distances which had
previously precluded certain forms of interactions no longer serve that
function. What globalization-under current market and political
conditions-has done is promote interest in forms of governance that
regulate transactions outside and beyond the nation-state. That interest, in
turn, has generated new opportunities for women to advance equality
claims. Equality is not a necessary outcome of federating, but with the
formulations of new structures come opportunities for alternative allocation
of power. Gaps in governance are spaces in which all power-seekers, be
261. A parallel critique challenges the assumption that the "national" will be receptive to
international human rights norms. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A
Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh 's Optimism, 35 HOUs. L. REv. 683 (1998).
262. See Spiro, supra note 221, at 571-72 (arguing that states are frequent violators of human
rights, with examples of police brutality, prison conditions, and the death penalty). See generally
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (declining to stop a state execution challenged on grounds
of violation of international law because of procedural default on the claim).
263. Cf. Saskia Sassen, Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7, 27-28 (1996) (arguing that transnationa migrations may be a means by
which women gain authority, both within households and beyond, and hence that some global
trends have empowered certain groups of women). See generally CHRISTA WICHTERICH, THE
GLOBALIZED WOMAN 1-33 (Patrick Camiller trans., Zed Books 2d ed. 2000) (1998) (arguing the
economic injuries that flow from globalization). The complexity of globalization for women is
also examined in Carla Freeman, Is Local:Global as Feminine:Masculine? Rethinking the Gender
of Globalization, 26 SIGNS 1007 (2001).
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they entrenched or newly fabricated, try to gain toeholds. And in this era,
women's rights and human rights advocates have prompted governance
institutions to make statements of commitment to equal treatment.2"
That women have windows of opportunity to participate in generating
laws does not necessarily result in laws good for all women. Serious
questions, constant within feminism, remain about how to shape such
equality demands and about which women will benefit.265 The category
"women"-like the others discussed herein-is neither unitary nor
necessarily permanent. Indeed, proponents of many forms of affirmative
action deploy categories of identity in the hope of their future incoherence.
Further, provisions that may benefit one group of women may not serve
others of differing classes and races. The debates about the enactment of
VAWA addressed such concerns.266 Transnational rights advanced in the
name of women must also be interrogated to understand how their
applications vary.267
Moreover, words about equality committed to paper in transnational
documents such as CEDAW do not necessarily translate into conditions of
equality in the lives of women and men.2 68 For example, some of the 165
countries that have ratified CEDAW have conditions oppressive to women
more detrimental than those in the United States, a country that has not
ratified CEDAW. Further, even when countries ratified CEDAW, they did
so with unusually high numbers of reservations.269 In addition, CEDAW has
264. See Helen Durham, Women and Civil Society: NGOs and International Criminal Law,
in 3 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 191, at 819 (2001).
265. See, e.g., Bob Reinalda, Dea Ex Machina or the Interplay Between National and
International Policymaking: A Critical Analysis of Women in the European Union, in SEX
EQUALITY POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 194, at 197 (analyzing the inability to move
beyond formal gender equality models).
266. KimberI6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Rivera, supra note 92, at 491-
509.
267. For example, what gender meant was a point of contention in the framing of provisions
of the International Criminal Court. According to Steains, the text leaves open the possibility of
inclusion of sexual orientation as a form of impermissible persecution but does not so specify
because some states would not agree to that express prohibition. Steains, supra note 207, at 370-
74.
268. See, e.g., John Valery White & Christopher L. Blakesley, Women or Rights: How
Should Women's Rights Be Conceived and Implemented?, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 191, at 51 (2000) (registering disappointment at enforcement of
women's rights and advocating better standards for implementation of CEDAW); see also
NUSSBAUM, supra note 182, at 24-31 (discussing India's "very woman-friendly" constitution but
a "reality" of great inequality, citing examples including rape, child marriage, child labor, and
violence).
269. Press Briefing on Optional Protocol to Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Dec. 10, 1999) (on file with author); see also Hilary
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 631-33 (1991) (discussing the significance of those reservations); William A.
Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
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limited means of implementation. 7 ° CEDAW constitutes an achievement of
significant legal and political proportions, but its translation into practice
has not fully materialized.2 7' Similarly, I make no claim that international
organizations are particularly receptive to women's rights; indeed, some are
notoriously poor places for women to work.272 Nor are NGOs a glorious
alternative, as they often not only reflect gendered allocations of work and
authority but risk reinscribing them. 73
79 (1997) (detailing the reservations to both treaties and the problems that such reservations
entail).
270. One mechanism is a state-to-state complaint, brought to the International Court of
Justice. Another is a system of reports, in which member states take on the obligation to study and
report on their own implementation efforts. A committee, comprised of twenty-three members,
receives the reports and then engages in an exchange with the reporting state about the
achievements and problems. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, supra note 167, arts. 17, 18, 1249 U.N.T.S. 21, 22; see also ASSESSING THE
STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 218. The Committee's limited staff and significant workload is
detailed by member Dame Silvia Cartwright in The Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
191, at 165-81 (2000). Some states that have signed CEDAW had not, as of 1998, filed reports;
others have provided stale information. Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT'L LAW.
637 (1999).
A third implementation mechanism is of more recent vintage and as of this writing has yet to
be used. By December 2000, a sufficient number of countries had ratified an "optional protocol"
to bring into effect the provision that, after exhausting available internal remedies, women may
bring complaints directly to the CEDAW committee. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda
Item 109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (1999). See also Women's Charges To Be Heard Now in U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at A13; U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL: TEXT AND MATERIALS 1-2, 6-7, 110-18, U.N. Sales No. E.00.IV.2 (2000) (detailing
the process and also stating in Article 17 that any member state signing this protocol may not
impose reservations).
271. Testing the effects of CEDAW requires a metric; for example, some argue that CEDAW
has empowered NGOs concerned with women's rights in their work both transnationally and
within countries. See Afsharipour, supra note 208, at 146-70 (discussing noncompliance while
maintaining optimism about the progress made through pressure from women's NGOs).
272. See Inglis, supra note 208, at 114-18 (describing the "extreme gender imbalance in
positions of power" in the United Nations); Charlesworth ct al., supra note 269, at 622-30
(detailing such problems in United Nations-based activities, as well as the normative structures of
international law that make equality work difficult).
273. See Sabine Lang, The NGOization of Feminism: Institutionalization and Institution
Building Within the German Women's Movements, in TRANSITIONS, ENVIRONMENTS, AND
TRANSLATIONS: FEMINISMS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 101, 116 (Joan W. Scott, Cora Kaplan
& Debra Keates eds., 1997) (describing the use of NGOs to channel women into "local contexts,
the tertiary sector, and the feminist social service and job market," putting them at the margins of
political decisionmaking); Deborah Mindry, Nongovernmental Organizations, "Grassroots," and
the Politics of Virtue, 26 SIGNS 1187 (2001) (examining NGO work in South Africa and finding
both transformation of traditional gender and racial politics as well as enduring residues of
colonialism). See generally FEMINISTS DOING DEVELOPMENT (Marilyn Porter & Ellen Judd eds.,
1999) (providing case studies of efforts to enhance women's economic wherewithal);
BISHWAPRIYA SANYAL, COOPERATIVE AUTONOMY: THE DIALECTIC OF STATE-NGOs
RELATIONSHIP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Int'l Inst. for Labour Studies, Research Series No.
100, 1994) (analyzing the multiple relationships between NGOs and states and the structural
attributes of effective NGOs).
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Rather, globalism offers a contested political space, an interesting,
additional place of potential power, of shifting categories and of new
organizations. Proponents of women's rights have had the occasion to work
in that venue and have been able to bring attention to injuries and their
sources that heretofore were not of great interest to international
institutions. A contemporary account can properly point to the correlation
between expressions of human rights and certain transnational efforts made
possible by historically specific conditions but ought not to lapse into
essentializing any level of governance as intrinsically a source of equality
norms.
Moving toward a multi-faceted approach thus requires a willingness to
face such complexities. The nation-state has been the means of governance
for some three centuries, and for each harm that form of government has
generated, a benefit can also be detailed. The perceived desirability of shifts
that diminish the import of the nation as the key unit of governance depends
in part on empirical assessments resting inevitably on debatable databases
and a host of unknowns. If the nation no longer serves as a unit of
accountability, if (for example) within the United States the "one voice"
doctrine of international law relaxes, will a larger role for regions and
localities do harm to the political stability of the United States and whatever
human rights agendas it espouses? Might categorical federalism be a better
route to import evolving equality norms into United States jurisprudence,
based on an understanding that international law is itself a part of national
law and therefore could preempt divergent state practices?274 Are
international human rights obligations assigned at the national level at risk
if localities gain prominence and the reliance on national borders
diminishes?
These questions are not, of course, novel or unique to the United States.
Every federation is an ongoing experiment in how to maintain
accountability and distinctive agendas concurrent with the reduction of the
saliency of borders.275 While at one time, physical power and physical space
provided at least temporizing answers that made plausible that unity of
power (democratic or not), those boundaries no longer have the capacity to
276contain.
274. This is an approach suggested by Harold Koh. See Koh, Bringing International Law
Home, supra note 9.
275. See DE BURCA, supra note 6 (addressing this issue in the context of the European
Union); de Bdrca, supra note 255 (arguing that the legal formulation of exclusive competence in
the EU system is not helpful because it addresses only two levels of authority-the European
Community and the Member State-and because it relies on efficiency over other criteria for
determining the proper level of decisionmaking).
276. JEAN-MARIE GUI HENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE (Victoria Elliott trans.,
Univ. of Minn. Press 1995) (1993).
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The argument is not that place is irrelevant. The local is very much
present in each person's life, manifested by the persons with whom one
forms families and communities, by the weather systems that shape daily
routines, and by the regions that are proximate and offer either friendship or
hostility. But the boundaries of a given nation no longer control markets
and can no longer promise physical security. In a parallel fashion, the
family unit (predicated on very undemocratic power) once controlled
goods, services, and people. The revolt against patriarchal families also
ruptures the ability to confine familiar relationships to only certain kinds of
pairings and offspring. The litigation about the civil remedy in VAWA
raised an enduring problem of United States constitutional law about how
to divide the power of judgment between courts and legislatures and, to a
lesser extent, between states and Congress. The majority sought to answer
by turning back to old images of state boundaries and to worn equations of
jurisdiction and gender. The assumptions that located certain forms of
action in the nation and other forms of action in local institutions have been
overtaken by the permeability of institutions, both large scale political and
small scale familial. Therefore, a retreat to those categories becomes a
willed but unsuccessful effort to buffer oneself and one's country from the
transformations with which one has to live.
One cannot essentialize particular forms of federated governance as
guarantees of certain outcomes or particular kinds of family relationships as
generative of human growth. In the end, neither categorical nor multi-
faceted federalism provides solutions to the problem of democratic
organization and accountability. These are but the forms that may,
depending on the content and meaning humans import to them, serve such
ends.
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